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ABSTRACT
Wolfram, Sophie, M.S., Spring 2017

Environmental Studies

Recognition, Participation, and Distributive Justice: Community-Based Environmental ProblemSolving in Southeast San Francisco and Imperial County, California
Chairperson: Neva Hassanein
An extensive body of environmental justice literature has demonstrated repeatedly what
impacted communities have long known from experience, that environmental pollution including
groundwater threats, diesel particulate matter, toxic releases, pesticide use, and hazardous waste
sites, disproportionately burdens people of color and low-income communities. The
environmental justice movement seeks to bring about equal protection of all people from
environmental hazards, including equal enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.
Advocacy within the movement has frequently adopted oppositional framings with respect to the
state; however, collaborative approaches to environmental justice problem-solving have become
more common, especially as states increasingly recognize environmental justice in policy. This
thesis investigates a California community-based environmental reporting network called
Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) through interviews and participant
observation in two sites: the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood of San Francisco, and the
Imperial Valley in Southern California. The paper argues that IVAN functions to build
relationships and trust between community members and government bodies, impose
accountability on regulatory agencies, foster social learning that benefits all stakeholders, and
solve pollution problems that affect public health, quality of life, and the physical environment.
By creating and sustaining a forum that addresses community concerns related to the
environment, IVAN acknowledges the validity of residents’ experiences, invites meaningful
participation in the process of enforcement of environmental regulations, and, to a limited
degree, reduces the pollution burden in low-income communities of color. I argue that in this
way, IVAN’s collaborative approach to problem-solving is effective in bridging multiple
dimensions of environmental justice.
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INTRODUCTION
I was a victim of pesticide poisoning my first days in Imperial County. That's why I live
out in Ocotillo, because I had to escape. I could not live in a place where I was getting
sick from pesticides. It really scares me what people there in the county are being
exposed to. There’s no justification for some of this stuff.
-Edie, Imperial Valley resident

The first time I met Edie, we were seated on opposite ends of a conference room
table under the fluorescent lights of a meeting room in the El Centro branch of the
California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC). Like so many of the people
I spoke with as this project developed, Edie’s primary concern with regards to
environmental health is not for herself; she worries mostly about those who are more
vulnerable than herself, and she works doggedly to improve environmental conditions for
them. That day, in November 2016, we were participating in a monthly meeting of the
Imperial Valley Environmental Justice Task Force, and we were joined by representatives
of federal, state, and regional government bodies; staff members from a communitybased organization located in Brawley, California; and Ray, a resident of Mexicali,
Mexico. Over the course of two hours, I listened as the group discussed a series of reports
residents of the Imperial Valley – a border region of California one hundred miles or so
east of San Diego and sixty miles west of Yuma, Arizona – had filed online through a
website called IVAN.
The Task Force brainstormed better ways to apply gypsum to agricultural fields
so that nearby communities would not be affected by fine particulates, they clarified the
jurisdictions of the Air Pollution Control District (APCD) versus the state Air Resources
Board (CARB), and they discussed the increased incidence of valley fever in the region,
which Edie suggested might be attributable to the amount of desert land being disturbed
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to install utility-scale solar arrays to meet California’s aggressive mandate of 50 percent
renewable energy by 2030. They discussed illegal dumping by contractors who come to
the desert to avoid disposal fees as they off-load construction equipment and lab waste
(including explosives such as picric acid), and they talked about the challenges of local
politics and the lack of participation of county officials in Task Force meetings. After the
meeting, Edie and Ray shared their phone numbers and email addresses with me and
invited me to join members of the Task Force for dinner across the street.
⸎ ⸎ ⸎
The burdens of environmental pollution are not shared evenly across the
population, and all people do not have equal access to the decision-making processes that
result in the uneven distribution of hazards. In California, a state with one of the most
extensive environmental regulatory apparatuses in the nation, the correlation between
exposure to pollution and population characteristics such as race and income level
remains pronounced (Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 2017). This
paper tells the story of a program operating in low-income communities of color across
California that is attempting to affect systemic change in how environmental protection
works and in who benefits from the operations of the state regulatory apparatus. The
Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) program is a community-based
environmental reporting network that works like a one-stop shop for residents who want
to report anything from an acrid odor coming from an industrial facility to trash heaps in
an alleyway to diesel trucks idling in front of their homes or schools. When community
members witness any incident in their community that affects their health, quality of life,
or harms the environment where they live, they can report to IVAN, a program run by the
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community with participation from local, state, regional, and federal government bodies.
IVAN includes a Task Force that meets each month to discuss the reports filed and the
follow-up, if any, from agencies.
I examine the structure and the function of IVAN through two case studies
selected from the program’s seven locations: the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood in
San Francisco, and the Imperial Valley. I argue that in those sites, IVAN functions as a
unique forum for sustained communication among area residents, government agency
staff, and community-based organizations. Whereas environmental protection is typically
fragmented among many government entities with very specific jurisdictions, and public
participation in environmental decision-making is usually limited to engagement on
discrete issues at particular moments in time, IVAN is designed to involve the
community itself on an ongoing basis. The program organically integrates many facets of
environmental protection into a forum designed by and controlled by communities
impacted by the pollution the program addresses. This comprehensive, community-based
approach to environmental protection, I argue, creates the potential for IVAN to function
as a place for residents to experience recognition of the validity of their concerns,
participate meaningfully in problem-solving, and experience improvements in
environmental quality as a result.
In the background section that follows, I describe the history of IVAN in
California and show how residents, community-based organizations, and government
agency staff interact with the program. The section concludes with an overview of the
environmental hazards the populations of IVAN’s seven regions encounter. The literature
review explores the historical origins and theoretical dimensions of environmental
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justice. It provides an overview of the environmental enforcement apparatus in the United
States and in California and makes the case that low-income communities of color
experience weaker enforcement of environmental regulations than less socially
vulnerable populations do. The final section of the literature review frames the work
IVAN does by addressing the benefits and challenges of lay participation in
environmental decision-making and of collaborative versus oppositional approaches to
environmental justice advocacy. The methods section describes how and why I chose the
two case study sites for this project; the process of gathering data through semi-structured
interviews, participant observation, and document review; limitations of the methods, and
the methods used for data analysis. In the discussion section, I share key findings related
to IVAN’s function in both Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley and draw
connections between the role the program plays and theoretical dimensions of
environmental justice. The conclusion offers a final synthesis of the findings and offers
directions for future research.
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IVAN: HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND GEOGRAPHY
In the 2008 Enforcement Report of the California Department of Toxic Substances
Control (DTSC), its Acting Director acknowledged that communities facing environmental
injustice had long demanded “transparency and regular communication about what’s being done
to keep them safe from toxic dangers” (DTSC 2008: 3). In response to that ongoing pressure, in
2007 DTSC began its Environmental Justice Enforcement Initiative, a key component of which
were day-long tours of sites local residents suspected to be hazardous to the environment and to
public health (DTSC 2008). After each bus tour, community residents, activists, and government
staff attended workshops to discuss what they had seen that day and collectively “set strategy
and priorities for enforcement efforts in true democratic style” (DTSC 2008: 12). Despite
DTSC’s attempts to engage meaningfully with communities, however, many activists and some
DTSC staff members felt that the Environmental Justice Enforcement Initiative did not go far
enough to develop ongoing dialogue with those most burdened by multiple sources of pollution
(Jatkar and London 2015).
Among those who remained concerned that the severity of the problems facing
California’s poor communities of color warranted more than a one-off bus tour and a check-in
with the community after 100 days were then-DTSC enforcement staff member Ryan Atencio
and Luis Olmedo. Olmedo is the Executive Director of Comité Cívico Del Valle (CCDV), an
organization focused on environmental justice, health services, and community services
programs in Imperial County (Comité Cívico Del Valle 2016). Atencio successfully appealed to
DTSC for more staff time to be allotted to department collaboration with community
environmental justice organizations, and in 2009, DTSC and CCDV, along with other
community-based organizations, established the Imperial County Environmental Justice Task
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Force (Jatkar and London 2015). At monthly Task Force meetings, residents reported
environmental problems facing their communities. Atencio made sure that the reports reached
the appropriate agencies, and he also began mapping where violations were occurring. The
program eventually changed its name to Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods
(IVAN). IVAN’s intent is to improve health outcomes, increase visibility of environmental
problems in the communities where it works, and facilitate greater transparency and
accountability in public agency responses to reports of environmental violations (Jatkar and
London 2015).
Today, IVAN is active in seven sites across California: Imperial, Kern, Fresno, and Kings
counties; Eastern Coachella Valley (a section of Riverside County); and the Wilmington and
Bayview Hunters Point neighborhoods in Los Angeles and San Francisco, respectively. At the
heart of each IVAN site are an online system and an Environmental Justice Task Force. The
online system allows residents to report potential environmental violations using their computer
or phone. The IVAN website and application allow residents to type a description and post
photos and/or videos documenting the problem about which they are filing their report. For
example, if a resident were to report illegal dumping, he or she would write a brief note about
what how much trash has been dumped and where, and might also upload a photo or video
documenting details of the site. In addition, residents can indicate the geographic location of the
subject of their report both by typing the approximate address and also by dropping a pin using a
feature enabled by Google Maps (IVAN 2016). Those without access to the technology needed
to submit a report online can attend the monthly IVAN Task Force meetings that take place in
each IVAN site.
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The IVAN Task Force meetings are co-convened by public agency staff and non-profit
organizations. They are open to the public and are attended by community members, government
agency staff, and community-based organizations. At the Task Force meetings, participants
discuss the reports filed online during the preceding month; any participant is free to share
technical expertise, firsthand knowledge about the report, questions, or concerns. At many
meetings, a government agency delivers a presentation about an issue relevant to the community.
In each region, one person, usually a government agency employee, takes the role of problemsolver. The problem-solver is responsible for checking the online reporting system and ensuring
that a staff member at the relevant agencies receive and address the complaint. Not every
complaint is a violation, so addressing the complaint does not always mean launching an
investigation or taking enforcement action. As I describe in the Discussion section of this paper,
there is significant variation between the structure and function of the Task Forces in the two
regions investigated in this study. In all regions, however, the Task Force is a forum where
anyone can bring health and quality of life concerns to the attention of residents of the region,
government agencies, and community-based organizations.
In California, rural inland valleys that are home to largely low-income populations with a
high percentage of Latino residents endure the greatest proportion of environmental health
hazards and are the most socially vulnerable (Office of Environmental Health Hazard
Assessment 2016). For instance, the San Joaquin Valley comprises the southern half of
California’s Central Valley. It includes Kings, Merced, Fresno, and Kern counties; IVAN
operates in all but Merced. The Valley is known for its enormous agricultural productivity, but
residents in the region also face environmental health hazards, including severe air pollution,
unsafe drinking water, poor infrastructure, and a disproportionate share of California’s toxic
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waste sites (CRPE 2011). The sources of pollution in the Valley include nitrates from synthetic
fertilizers and pesticides that have degraded the quality of groundwater; particulate matter and
smog from mega-dairies; oil refineries; and diesel trucks and other vehicles on Interstate-5.
Poverty and a lack of public participation compound the problem of environmental pollution
(CRPE 2011). Many residents depend on very low-wage jobs in polluting industries, and the
political process often remains inaccessible to the residents who do not have access to the
internet to receive notification of public meetings; who lack transportation to the county seat or
Sacramento to attend meeting; and who speak only Spanish and cannot understand the English in
which most meetings are conducted (CRPE 2011).
The Eastern Coachella Valley (ECV) and the Imperial Valley, two other regions where
IVAN operates, lie immediately north and south of the Salton Sea, respectively, in southeastern
California. The ECV is in Riverside County, south of much more affluent Palm Springs, and the
Imperial Valley, in Imperial County, stretches from the Salton Sea to the north to the border city
of Calexico on its southern end. A predominantly rural and agricultural region, Imperial County
consistently ranks within the top ten agriculturally productive counties in the nation (Imperial
County 2014). Environmental pollution from multiple sources poses significant health risks to
both Imperial Valley and ECV residents. Industrial agriculture contributes to water and air
pollution; the Salton Sea, California’s largest lake, is receding and causing contaminants such as
mercury, lead, and arsenic to become airborne; and the transportation of goods along Interstate-8
and idling trucks at the border crossing in Calexico lead to high levels of particulate matter in the
air (California Environmental Health Tracking Program 2015). One in five children in Imperial
County have been diagnosed with asthma, and asthma hospitalization rates there are the highest
in the state; the link between asthma and pollution is well-established (Bacon 2012). Meanwhile,

8

many ECV residents live in substandard housing with inadequate infrastructure, including lack
of access to safe drinking water and failing septic systems (London et al. 2013).
IVAN also operates in two urban communities: Bayview Hunters Point in San Francisco
and Wilmington in Los Angeles. Bayview Hunters Point, historically the industrial hub of the
city, is a low-income neighborhood in the southeastern corner of San Francisco. Residents in that
community face toxic contamination from the former PG&E Hunters Point power plant, the
Southeast Sewage Treatment plant, pollution from diesel freight transport, two freeways, and
over 150 brownfield sites (Greenaction 2016). Wilmington is one of several neighborhoods in
central and southern Los Angeles that encounter “foul odors, noise and dirt from oil operations
that are practically in their backyards” (Boxall and Mozingo 2016). A ConocoPhillips Oil
Refinery in Wilmington poses quality-of-life challenges in the form of flaring, toxic releases, and
particulate matter pollution (Coalition for a Safe Environment 2014).
In each of the seven communities where it is active, IVAN occupies a small niche in a
long history both of environmental injustice and of advocacy to stem the tide of pollution
adversely affecting the health and quality of life of residents. The following section explores the
theoretical and historical context in which IVAN is situated and introduces questions about the
efficacy of environmental justice problem-solving approaches that, as IVAN does, invite some
measure of partnership or collaboration with government entities.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on environmental justice offers myriad examples of how low-income
communities of color shoulder a disproportionate burden of environmental hazards while
enjoying less than their share of benefits. In this section, I first trace the origins of the
environmental justice movement in the United States. The next portion of the literature review
introduces dimensions of environmental justice – distributive, procedural, and recognition justice
– and describes the ways they intersect and interact. After providing a theoretical overview, I
hone in on the topic of enforcement of environmental regulations and address quantitative and
qualitative evidence of disparities in the degree to which enforcement is pursued in low-income
communities of color compared with more affluent, predominantly white communities. The
section concludes with a discussion of benefits and challenges of meaningful public participation
environmental justice problem-solving.
Launching the U.S. Environmental Justice Movement
In 1982, protests erupted in a predominantly African American community in Warren
County, North Carolina, over the decision to dump over 6,000 truckloads of soils contaminated
with polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), a highly toxic industrial chemical that was banned in the
1970s, into a landfill in that county (Geiser and Waneck 1994). The campaign against the
landfill, led by veterans of the civil rights movement, drew national attention to the intersecting
issues of race, poverty, and pollution. Although communities had previously protested the siting
of polluting facilities near where they lived, worked, and played, the protests in Warren County
are widely recognized as marking the beginning of the environmental justice movement (Bullard
and Johnson 2000; Sandweiss 1998).

10

The protests and subsequent arrests in Warren County prompted the 1983 U.S. General
Accounting Office study, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation with Racial
and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, which revealed that off-site hazardous waste
landfills in the South were disproportionately sited in African American communities. The
events also led the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice to produce Toxic
Wastes and Race in the United States (1987), which found that race was the most powerful
predictor of the location of toxic waste sites nationally (Bullard and Johnson 2000). The
environmental justice movement soon expanded its antitoxics focus to include “public health,
worker safety, land use, transportation, housing, resource allocation, and community
empowerment” (Bullard and Johnson 2000: 556-7).
The concept of environmental racism lies at the heart of the environmental justice
movement. We can understand environmental racism as a specific form of institutional, or
systemic, racism. The anti-toxics movement in the late 1970s understood toxic assaults as part of
an economic structure in which certain communities will inevitably be polluted. The civil rights
activists who participated in the environmental justice movement recognized the unfair
distributive outcomes of that economic structure as resulting from a social structure that isolated
and marginalized people of color (Cole and Foster 2000). In other words, the disproportionate
pollution burden experienced by people of color is yet another consequence of institutional
racism; manifestations of institutional racism pertaining to environmental effects are termed
environmental racism. Specifically, environmental racism “refers to any policy, practice, or
directive that differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended)
individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color” (Bullard 1990: 98). The grassroots
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activism that has fueled the environmental justice movement represents the convergence of the
economic analysis of the anti-toxics movement and the recognition of environmental racism.
While the environmental justice movement emerged in the South and shared key actors,
an interpretive frame, and organizing tactics with the Civil Rights movement (Cole and Foster
2000, Sandweiss 1998), it also has a distinct history in California. Many environmental justice
activists in California can trace their activism back to involvement with the United Farm
Workers, and the environmental justice movement remains deeply connected to the struggles of
farmworkers for decent pay and safe working and living conditions in the state (Center on Race,
Poverty, and the Environment 2011). Activists decry the fact that many rural, largely Hispanic
communities across the state produce a large share of the nation’s food yet serve as a dumping
ground for vast quantities of toxic waste (Huang and London 2012).
For many grassroots activists, a report published in 1984 confirmed their suspicions that
industry and regulators were intentionally targeting low-income communities and communities
of color when siting polluting facilities. The Cerrell Report, commissioned by the California
Integrated Waste Management Board (now CalRecycle) to identify communities that would be
the least likely to resist the siting of waste incinerators, recommended looking for communities
where many residents were Catholic, had limited education and low socioeconomic status, and
were employed in resource extractive industries (Cole and Foster 2001; CRPE 2014). In reaction,
through community organizations and regional networks, grassroots activists in California
address the siting of polluting facilities in vulnerable communities, the harmful effects of
industrial agriculture, the disproportionate effect of climate change on low-income people and
communities of color, and, through Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN),
unequal enforcement of environmental laws and regulations (CRPE 2016).
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Partially in response to grassroots activism, federal and state policies have increasingly
addressed environmental justice issues (Targ 2005). California’s state government takes a
comprehensive approach, integrating environmental justice broadly into the work of state
government (Targ 2005). The state’s Environmental Justice Act of 1999 defined environmental
justice as “the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the
development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations,
and policies” (California Code Section 65040.12). That statute made the Office of Planning and
Research (OPR) the coordinating agency in the California state government for all environmental
justice programs (Office of Planning and Research 2003). OPR serves the Governor as the state’s
comprehensive planning agency; it has a broad mandate to develop, evaluate, and update policies
that shape statewide growth, development, and environmental quality (California Code Section
65040). Under the 1999 Act, the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) is
required to integrate environmental justice into its mission and the mission statements of its
divisions.
Dimensions of Environmental Justice
Definitions of environmental justice, including the one used by the State of California,
often emphasize its distributive dimension, which refers to the demand for equitable distribution
of environmental burdens and benefits (Schlosberg 2004). The early landmark reports on
environmental justice, for example, by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the Commission
for Racial Justice, demonstrated the disproportionate siting of hazardous waste facilities in
minority communities (Bullard and Johnson 2000). Activists calling for environmental justice
demand more, however, than equal distribution of harms. Questions about who gets to make
decisions regarding issues such as the siting of hazardous waste facilities and the prioritization of

13

enforcement activities, and how those decision-making processes work, are of great concern for
environmental justice activists (Schlosberg 2004, Shrader-Frechette 2002). In other words,
certain power structures and processes have led to inequitable distribution in the first place, and
environmental justice advocacy must address how environmental governance decisions are
made. This dimension of environmental justice is called procedural justice. The third key
dimension, in addition to distributive and procedural, is recognition justice, which refers to a
right to recognition and respect for cultural norms and ways of knowing that differ from the
dominant or mainstream culture (Fraser 1998).
The cultural injustices that deny recognition and the economic injustices that lead to
inequitable distribution are intertwined; therefore, all three key dimensions must be in place for
justice to be achieved (Fraser 1998; Figueroa 2004). The demand for procedural justice appears
in the “Principles of Environmental Justice” drafted and adopted at the 1991 People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. The seventh principle states,
“Environmental justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of
decision-making including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and
evaluation” (reprinted in Hofrichter 1993: 238). Procedural justice, often used interchangeably
with the term ‘meaningful participation,’ may, under certain conditions, contribute to distributive
justice, or the call for substantive rights (Sandweiss 1998). Meaningful public participation in
decision-making processes can only occur when the perspectives of ethnically and culturally
diverse groups are recognized by those in positions of power.
For that reason, recognition stands on its own as a critical component of environmental
justice, acknowledging that low-income and people of color communities can experience
meaningful participation and distributional equity only if those vested with decision-making
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power grant those communities the same degree of respect that they offer to more affluent, white
communities (Schlosberg 2004). In other words, they must recognize the legitimacy of the
experiences and knowledge of less powerful communities. The politics of recognition emphasize
the fundamental importance of making cultural perspectives socially and culturally visible and
hold that the racism inherent in ignoring those perspectives is what allows for material inequity
(Figueroa 2004). Furthermore, Figueroa (2004: 8) argues that according to the politics of
recognition, deeply understanding “the complexity of cultural identity” is one route to
“identifying and ameliorating the injustice, in this case environmental racism.” The three key
dimensions of environmental justice represent three related lenses through which to observe and
analyze advocacy efforts. By bringing government, residents, and community organizations
together address environmental violations affecting community health, IVAN may offer a path to
achieve a greater measure of procedural, recognition, and distributive justice in California
communities that have long endured environmental injustices.
Environmental Justice in Monitoring and Enforcement
As great an impact as policy development and individual siting decisions have on
progress toward environmental justice, environmental monitoring and enforcement of existing
laws and regulations is equally critical to ensure that unequal exposure is not exacerbated by
unequal enforcement. Reisinger et al. (2010: 5) note that a “standard set by statute or regulation,
if not enforced, acts merely as a recommendation.” While ample evidence supports the claim that
people of color are disproportionately burdened by environmental pollution in the United States
(Bullard and Johnson 2000; Cole and Foster 2001), fewer quantitative studies confirm whether
enforcement of environmental law is delivered equitably. Although many qualitative accounts
and case studies demonstrate enforcement disparities between low-income people of color

15

communities and more affluent, predominantly white communities, quantitative studies are less
conclusive.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) grants primacy to state
agencies to implement and enforce many federal laws, including the Clean Air Act; the Clean
Water Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) (Gray and Shimshack 2011; Reisinger et al. 2010). The U.S. EPA and state
agencies primarily rely on a command-and-control system of rules and deterrence to maximize
compliance (Gunningham 2011). In recent decades, federal agencies responsible for enforcement
have also embraced more cooperative methods such as compliance assistance, mediation and
outreach; however, Gray and Shimshack (2011) find that despite the increasing deployment of
these alternative methods, deterrence remains the most important factor guiding facilities’
compliance decisions. They suggest that because monitoring and enforcement have a more
significant impact on environmental performance than do “corporate social responsibility,
altruism, or nonregulatory pressures,” big increases in environmental quality might be achieved
through “small incremental investments in monitoring and enforcement” (2011: 17). While Gray
and Shimshack (2011) suggest that policies allocating more resources for enforcement might
yield significant benefits, Gunningham (2011: 190) also suggests that efforts to extend the reach
of regulators using third parties as “surrogate regulators” to monitor industry merit further study.
In California, the state’s Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) coordinates
enforcement activities through its boards, departments, and offices that are responsible for
compliance with regulating toxics, air, pesticides, water, and solid waste and recycling (CalEPA
2014).1 In addition to its regular enforcement activities, CalEPA has established an
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The California Air Resources Board and Air Districts enforce regulations related to mobile and stationary sources
of emissions, respectively. The Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) oversees the full range of
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Environmental Justice Task Force to address compliance and enforcement in areas of California
that “are burdened by multiple sources of pollution and disproportionately vulnerable to its
effects” (CalEPA 2016). The Task Force has completed two pilot initiatives in Fresno (20132014) and in the Boyle Heights and Pacoima neighborhoods of Los Angeles (2015-2016). The
2016 Budget Act granted the Task Force, which was founded in 2013 as a working group,
permanent funding (CalEPA 2013; CalEPA 2016).
The debate surrounding the question of whether enforcement disparities exist erupted
after a 1992 study in the National Law Journal found that penalties for violations of pollution
laws were on average 46 percent higher in white communities than in communities of color, and
that communities of color took 20 percent longer to be listed as priority clean-up sites under the
Superfund law (Bullard and Johnson 2000; Cole and Foster 2001: 57). That study has been
criticized, however, for not disclosing key data such as sample sizes and sizes of the studied
communities (Bryant 1993). It is nevertheless frequently cited as evidence of enforcement
disparities (Agyeman 2005; Bullard and Johnson 2000; Pellow 2000).
In another quantitative study supporting the claim that enforcement is uneven, Konisky
and Reenock (2013) find evidence that when enforcement authority is highly centralized near the
top of an agency’s chain of command, an increase in the percentage of Hispanic residents in a
community correlates with a decrease in rates of detection of noncompliance. That means that
when there are more Hispanic residents, inspectors are less likely to find a that a facility is out of
compliance. In contrast, when field officers have a high degree of enforcement authority,

processes related to hazardous substances; in addition, CalEPA delegates regulation of some hazardous materials to
local agencies known as California Unified Program Agencies (CUPAs). The California Department of Pesticide
Regulation delegates pesticide registration, monitoring, and enforcement to its 55 county agricultural
commissioners. The State Water Resources Control Board regulates over 37,000 facilities and is charged with
protecting California’s water resources, including drinking water. Finally, CalRecycle partners with local and state
agencies to oversee recycling facilities including but not limited to composting sites, beverage container processors,
and landfills.
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detection of noncompliance is not affected by the percentage of Hispanic residents in a
community. In that case, findings of noncompliance are consistent regardless of the percentage
of Hispanic residents. The research also suggests that the degree of mobilization around
environmental justice issues in a community positively affects the rate of detection of
noncompliance. The implications of their study seem to be that, at least in some cases, the
demographic characteristics and political engagement of a community may influence regulators’
compliance monitoring.
Despite the lack of clear conclusions drawn from quantitative studies attempting to
discern whether race or income status affect monitoring and enforcement, a wealth of case
studies demonstrates numerous instances when enforcement has been lacking or weak in lowincome and people of color communities. One recent and particularly egregious example of weak
enforcement is the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, where city officials began treating Flint River
water without corrosion control, which allowed water to eat away at aging service lines,
exposing residents of the city to toxic levels of lead (Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016).
The Flint Water Advisory Task Force, appointed by Governor Rick Snyder in October of 2015 to
conduct an independent review, found that the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
failed to enforce the Safe Drinking Water Act. In addition, the U.S. EPA did not issue an order to
the state regulatory agency to comply with that Act, as it is required to do by law. The Task
Force noted, “EPA’s conduct casts doubt on its willingness to aggressively pursue enforcement
(in the absence of widespread public outrage)” (Flint Water Advisory Task Force 2016: 8-9).
The case studies described below cast similar doubt on the enforcement activities (or lack
thereof) of a range of state and federal agencies tasked with environmental protection.
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The experience of the Holt family, an African American family living in Dickson City,
Tennessee, provides an example of differential enforcement, where race appears to play a
significant role in determining the response of government agencies. In this case, the Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) repeatedly granted permits to a county
landfill that was polluting groundwater near a mostly African American community, despite
numerous violations (Bullard 2012). Fifty-four feet away from the landfill, the Holts owned and
operated a farm with a well that they used for drinking water. Although government tests on the
Holts’ well in 1988 farm revealed contamination by trichloroethylene (TCE), which was at the
time was a suspected carcinogen and is now categorized as “a ‘very hazardous mutagenic cancercausing chemical” (Bullard 2012: 133), the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment
assured them that their water quality was good and that the TCE levels were likely lab errors or
sampling errors. Over the next twelve years, TDEC and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency both expressed concerns internally about the possibility of contamination of the Holts’
well, yet they never shared any information about these discussions with the family. Finally, in
2000, the Holt family’s wells were retested and registered TCE levels twenty-nine times the
maximum contaminant level allowable by the EPA (Bullard 2012: 137). Meanwhile, when
spring water used by a white family in the same county was found to be contaminated with TCE,
county officials acted swiftly to notify the families, place them on the city tap system, and
perform nine tests on the spring over seven years, well after the family had stopped using the
spring for drinking water.
A case of environmental racism in West Ocala, Florida, further illustrates how, despite
vigorous community organizing, enforcement can be weak or non-existent in people of color
communities that already suffer from the disproportionate siting of industrial facilities in their
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neighborhoods. In this case, residents living close to a plant that baked scrap wood into charcoal
briquettes frequently found ash covering their cars, windows, and even surfaces inside their
homes. Concerned residents wrote letters to city, state, and federal officials describing health
issues resulting from persistent pollution emitted by the Royal Oak plant (Lerner 2010), yet the
state of Florida failed to investigate or enforce the Clean Air Act. Activism against Royal Oak
began in 1982 when resident Leroy Reed testified before the city council about the health effects
of the pollution, yet it was not until September of 2005 that the state finally investigated. In their
investigation, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) officials found emissions of
methanol, a highly neurotoxic chemical, at nine times the amount legally permitted. In addition,
the company had lied about having installed afterburners, which protect public health by
reducing the amount of particulate emissions. In all, DEP found nine potential violations of the
Clean Air Act (Lerner 2010). Almost immediately, Royal Oak officials closed the plant, 23 years
after residents began pleading with regulators to protect their health by investigating the content
and cause of the soot blanketing their neighborhoods.
Although California’s enforcement apparatus is vast and is increasingly focused on
justice, concerns remain about the efficacy of environmental enforcement generally and in
California specifically. While Gray and Shimshack (2011) argue that deterrence is highly
effective in achieving industry compliance, others offer more critical interpretations. Reisinger et
al. (2010) argue that this country’s enforcement model has proven ineffective, leaving many laws
unenforced, and that the political climate of resistance to regulation and the tightening of state
agency budgets have further constrained the effectiveness of enforcement measures. Further,
citizen suit provisions, included in most major environmental laws, allow public interest groups
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to sue the government and polluting entities for alleged violations; however, these suits are
increasingly hampered by procedural obstacles (Reisinger et al. 2010: 61).
In 2014 in California, the U.S. EPA found that a battery recycling facility owned by
Exide Technologies, located in the low-income and predominantly Hispanic neighborhood of
Vernon in Los Angeles, had violated the Clean Air Act’s emissions standards over 30 times since
the year 2000 (Kim 2014). The following year, in a settlement with the U.S. Attorney’s office,
the company admitted to the illegal disposal, storage, shipment, and transportation of hazardous
waste, all four of which are felony offenses (KPCC March 12 2015). Despite violations
documented by the California Department of Toxic Substances Control over several decades, the
department continued to allow the Exide plant to operate on a temporary permit. Activists in the
community had agitated for years for the closure and cleanup of the Exide site, yet the response
from government agencies was slow until the U.S. Attorney’s office stepped in. Cleanup and
lead testing in the roughly 10,000 potentially contaminated homes near the now-vacant plant
continues, but progress remains slow and frustrations among affected community members
continue to run high (Lopez 2016).
By contrast, when a methane gas leak occurred at a Southern California Gas Company
facility in the affluent, mostly white neighborhood of Porter Ranch in the San Fernando Valley in
northwest Los Angeles, the state responded swiftly. In September of 2016, the utility reached a
settlement with L.A. County prosecutors that included safety measures far exceeding state and
local regulations (Walton 2016). The leak forced 8,000 residents out of their homes, and before
they moved home, the company cleaned 1,500 home interiors and 1,200 exteriors, in addition to
public facilities such as schools and parks (Walton 2016). One year after the Exide plant shut
down, just 200 properties had been cleaned in southeastern Los Angeles (Lopez 2016).
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Community advocates in the Commerce, Bell, Huntington Park, East Los Angeles and Boyle
Heights noticed the disparities between how their environmental health crisis and the one in
Porter Ranch unfolded, finding them disappointing but far from surprising (Martinez 2016).
In addition to limitations on effective enforcement built into the system, specific
instances in California, such as the Exide case, have galvanized communities to speak out about
inadequate government responses to environmental violations. In another particularly glaring
case, the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) failed to recoup nearly $200 million
of taxpayer money meant to remediate hazardous waste sites or to remedy the fact that, for
decades, numerous hazardous waste facilities were operating on outdated permits with weak
environmental protections (Independent Review Panel 2016; Los Angeles Times Editorial Board
2014). In 2015, an independent review panel monitored ongoing problems within DTSC
including weak enforcement, a backlog of expired permits, and failure to collect money the state
was owed for cleaning contaminated sites (Barboza 2015). Incidences of severe pesticide drift
also illustrate how residents have had to struggle to have their experiences of environmental
violations taken seriously. For example, in Arvin, California, in 2002, the Department of
Pesticide Regulation (DPR) found that 252 were sickened by the pesticide metam sodium. DPR
investigated, despite the refusal of the County Agricultural Commissioner to find out how many
people were sickened or to delegate the task to the Department of Environmental Health. Only
extensive grassroots activism and the serendipitous presence of a reporter who captured their
work interviewing victims of the incident, caught the attention of DPR (Perkins n.d.). These and
similar incidents have led activists to demand more accountable, transparent, and responsive
enforcement.
Effective Participation in Environmental Decision-Making
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The call for procedural justice raises the question of what constitutes meaningful public
participation. What is meaningful involvement in decision-making processes, and what is simply
placation? Even collaborative processes heralded as innovative and inclusive can marginalize
environmental justice, so we must address the question of how to develop participatory processes
that respect and respond to participants’ knowledge and concerns (Shilling et al. 2009). Citizen
participation in governance is most meaningful when there is real power redistribution from
government to those seeking a voice in the process of policy development and implementation
(Arnstein 1969; Cole and Foster 2001). Arnstein’s typology of citizen participation breaks
participation into a ladder of eight categories climbing from forms of non-participation such as
manipulation by government, to power-sharing arrangements, such as partnership, delegated
power, and citizen control. Her schematic illustrates that participation exists along a gradient
from total government control to total citizen control, and that lip-service to participation
sometimes obscures exclusion.
Much of the grassroots organizing characteristic of the environmental justice movement
has occurred despite of or in opposition to the state, rather than through participation in formal
decision-making processes. For example, many communities adjacent to or downwind of heavy
industry have attempted to improve monitoring of air pollution and enforcement of
environmental regulations through community-based monitoring. The primary motivation
driving the work of these networks, some of which are known as “bucket brigades” because of
the modified five-gallon buckets in which they collect air samples, is the desire “to shift power
relations by allowing the community to access information that it alone controls” (Scott 2016:
266). For these communities, the data itself is a source of power. While community-based
environmental monitoring networks have galvanized residents and generated copious evidence of
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environmental health hazards, O’Rourke and Macey (2003) argue that “[w]here the bucket
brigades have yet to succeed is in promoting a division of roles between residents and the state
that can form a basis for the co-production of environmental protection” (407). They argue that
the data generated by bucket brigades can best influence the management of emitting facilities if
monitoring groups and regulators work together closely and on a regular basis. While advocating
for co-production of environmental monitoring, the authors also acknowledge that “a lack of coproduction limits the corruption or capture of community policing efforts,” hinting at the need to
take care in developing relationships between communities and public agencies (O’Rourke and
Macey 2003: 409).
Lee (2005) articulates several key advantages associated with a collaborative approach to
environmental justice issues that includes industry, government, and other institutions. A
collaborative model “fosters an integrated approach,” “promotes multi-agency coordination” and
“establishes multi-stakeholder partnerships to leverage human, organization, technical, and
financial resources” (Lee 2005: 221). To illustrate the value of the collaborative approach, Lee
interviewed Maria Moya and Paula Forbis with the Environmental Health Coalition (EHC) in
San Diego, who spearheaded a collaborative process to initiate land use reforms in the Barrio
Logan neighborhood of that city. The transcripts reveal that key components must be in place for
collaborative approaches to be effective. In EHC’s case, those components included a neutral
facilitator, equal responsibility for major stakeholders, and partnering agreements that required
interested parties to acknowledge the problem of environmental injustice as a prerequisite to
becoming full partners in the project were essential to effective collaboration (Lee 2005).
Whereas Lee employs case studies to illustrate the potential value of collaborative
approaches to environmental justice issues, Balazs and Lubell (2014) offer a theoretical
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framework for analyzing collaborative endeavors. First, participation in a collaborative process
can catalyze social learning, which allows stakeholders to connect in flexible networks, develop
social capital and trust, and collectively shape institutional change. The authors argue that the
role of social learning, a form of learning that occurs among varying stakeholders, is underdeveloped in environmental justice literature, which has emphasized instead how traditionally
marginalized groups learn from participation in environmental decision-making. Importantly,
Balazs and Lubell (2014: 99) posit social learning as a potential link between procedural and
distributive justice, suggesting that it acts as a tool to transform simply having a seat at the table
to transforming material outcomes. So, in addition to the integrated approach and maximization
of resources Lee points out as advantages, collaboration may also foster social learning that can
improve outcomes for disadvantaged communities.
Barriers to Effective Participation
Although procedural justice is a cornerstone of the environmental justice movement and
citizen participation a key component of American democracy in theory, a significant body of
literature has questioned the efficacy of participation in state environmental justice frameworks
and of collaborative approaches. Despite increased official recognition of environmental justice
in federal and state policy, scholars have articulated a series of challenges to achieving equity by
relying on the state to support movement objectives. Benford (2005: 50) notes with disapproval
how far the environmental justice movement has traveled from the environmental racism
discourse and direct action tactics on display in Warren County to “more acceptable, less
confrontational” and more collaborative framings. While public agencies might be willing to
grant environmental justice activists a seat at the table today, he remains concerned that the
movement’s emphasis on justice locks activists in to a dependence on the legislative and judicial
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system, “an ironic commitment to, and reaffirmation of, the systemic status quo” (Benford 2005:
51). Other literature echoes his concerns.
In particular, Pulido et al. (2016: 27) exhibit deep skepticism about the ultimate utility of
activists’ reliance on and engagement with the state. “The state,” they assert, “is not about to
eliminate the necessary ‘sinks’ that communities of color provide, for fear of both capital flight
and the wrath of conservatives. Instead, the state gives lip-service to environmental justice but
in fact does little to change the materiality of disproportionate pollution patterns.” They argue
that instead of viewing the state as a partner, the environmental justice movement should
identify the state as the adversary and challenge it directly rather than participating in empty
processes that fail to offer substantive changes. Sandweiss (1998) offers a similar assessment,
arguing that while the environmental justice movement and government agencies tend to agree
on problem definition (low-income people of color are disproportionately burdened by
pollution), consensus is lacking over the root causes of that disproportionate exposure, the
associated health risks, and the best solutions to the problem. The federal government has been
reluctant to frame environmental justice as a problem rooted in structural racism, emphasizing
economic status instead. Liévanos (2012) argues that it may be difficult for advocates to
challenge state actors on the same conceptual terms after the state has institutionalized an
environmental justice frame that differs significantly from movement framing.
In addition to the problem of different framings between movement actors and the state,
activists have often found themselves forced to look outside of formal processes, even those
supposedly designed for their participation, to ensure that their concerns are ultimately
addressed. As Cole and Foster (2001) note, many environmental laws provide for participation,
but they leave social relations in place, leading to the same marginalization of the experiences
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and perspectives of poor people of color that causes environmental injustice in the first place.
Environmental decision-making provisions for environmental justice tend to focus on
procedural rights instead of substantive ones, which has meant that activists may participate in
environmental decision-making, but their participation does not necessarily result in substantive
changes to policy (Sandweiss 1998).
A third challenge to meaningful public participation of communities affected by
environmental injustice is that the knowledge valued in regulatory processes is often scientific
expertise, which the lay public often lacks (Fiorino 2000). For example, for regulators to
investigate claims of illegal pollution, the knowledge held by communities based on their lived
experience, such as the experience of intense odors and associated physical symptoms, needs to
be translated into forms acceptable to the standards used by regulators. Scott (2016: 279)
explains, “The situation both forces residents to fall back on their senses and demands that they
transcribe their collective knowledge into new, and foreign, forms. It is an in-between,
uncomfortable place.” Although it is important not to reify or essentialize either local or
professional knowledge (Corburn 2007), community mistrust and perception of lack of respect
for local environmental knowledge remain significant barriers to effective collaboration (Lynn
2000). Despite the barriers presented by the divide between local and professional knowledge,
Corburn (2007: 158) argues that local knowledge can “extend the knowledge-base used for
decision-making” and suggests that co-production of knowledge can contribute to procedural
justice by increasing meaningful participation in environmental policy processes.
IVAN and Environmental Justice
Whether the environmental justice movement’s engagement with state frameworks,
participation in formal decision-making processes, and involvement in collaborative approaches
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can generate substantive improvements in burdened communities remains a subject of debate and
inquiry. The skepticism toward those approaches in much of the literature suggests that activists
seeking to achieve environmental justice by these less oppositional tactics may face significant
challenges. The fact remains, however, that environmental justice increasingly has been
institutionalized in the form of state policies and statutes, in part through grassroots pressure
(Targ 2005), and ongoing interaction between activists and government agencies represents a
possible path toward mitigating environmental health disparities. Short of undermining a
capitalist system premised on environmental racism (Cole and Foster 2001; Pulido et al. 2016),
collaborative approaches to enforcement may offer the possibility of increased mutual
recognition and respect among stakeholders, a greater sense of individual and collective power
among residents, and more robust monitoring and enforcement in otherwise marginalized
communities (Cole and Foster 2001; O’Rourke and Macey 2003).
Enforcement is an area of policy that is not sufficiently addressed in literature addressing
collaboration and engagement with state environmental justice frameworks and is of significant
concern to residents who bear the consequences of weak responses to environmental violations.
Mindful of how power dynamics of social relations and the bureaucratic incentives favoring lax
enforcement may impinge on collaborative approaches (Konisky and Reenock 2013), this project
asks to what extent collaborative models can contribute to environmental justice in enforcement.
I use case studies of two different IVAN sites to address that question.
The IVAN program offers intriguing cases because IVAN is a community-based effort
outside of the formal enforcement process, yet it features ongoing partnerships between public
agency staff and community organizations. It facilitates public participation in enforcement, but
instead of government bringing the public to the table, IVAN invites public officials to

28

participate in a community process. IVAN grew out of a dynamic of ongoing tension between
communities demanding stronger enforcement and state government gradually yielding to the
mounting pressure. These cases offer an opportunity to examine an innovative environmental
justice organizing strategy that builds spaces for public participation by bringing stakeholders
together on the terms of residents in affected communities.
I have asked two related questions of these cases. First, how are the interactions between
community organizations and public agencies structured and how do they function? I am
interested in how the interactions between public agencies, community organizations, and
residents enhance and/or constrain IVAN’s capacity to both address community values and
concerns and improve environmental enforcement. I have paid especially close attention to
whether and how different stakeholders negotiate knowledge claims at Taskforce meetings and
considered to what extent environmental protection is co-produced through the relationship
between public agencies and community organizations and residents, and through what
processes. In addition, as described in the methods section below, by analyzing responses to
interview questions and field notes from Task Force meetings, I have considered whether
problem definition is contested terrain within the partnerships that comprise IVAN’s Task
Forces. In other words, is there consensus as to the problems IVAN is addressing, the perceived
sources of those problems, and the proposed solutions (Benford and Snow 2000), and what
consequences do variations in reasons for participating and desired outcomes have for the
success of the partnership.
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METHODOLOGY
This study used a qualitative approach, which allowed me to gather and analyze data in a
way that emphasizes the “social meaning people attribute to their experiences, circumstances,
and situations” (Hesse-Biber 2017: 4). A qualitative approach is particularly well suited to
projects that seek to understand and value multiple subjective perspectives, which I have aimed
to do in my study of participants’ perspectives on IVAN (Hesse-Biber 2017). Conducting two
case studies of sites within the IVAN network allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the
interactions at the heart of the Environmental Justice Task Forces; focusing on two sites made it
possible to gather comparative data on multiple experiences. I have used in-depth, semistructured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis to yield a fairly robust set
of data that can be triangulated to enhance reliability (Hesse-Biber 2017). The data has been used
for two purposes: first, to review the structure and function of the Environmental Justice Task
Forces, by which I mean who participates in the Task Forces, what the roles and responsibilities
of participants are, the content and format of meetings, and what roles IVAN plays in the
communities where it operates. Second, the data has been used to evaluate the degree to which
IVAN is effective in serving the functions described by Task Force members.
Site Selection
To achieve an in-depth understanding of the structure and function of the partnerships in
IVAN’s Task Forces, I gathered and analyzed data on a sample of two out of the seven IVAN
sites: Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley. Studying this small sample allowed me to
develop a robust understanding of each of the two sites and to draw comparisons and contrasts
between them. There are five rural and two urban sites within IVAN, so I opted to study one
urban site (Bayview Hunters Point) and one rural site (Imperial Valley) to represent that
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distribution. The Imperial Valley site was established first, in 2009, and the Bayview Hunters
Point site in San Francisco, established in 2015, is the most recent addition to the network.
Including the oldest and newest sites allowed me to capture a range of experiences in IVAN’s
Task Forces as group processes evolve over time.
The IVAN sites are geographically dispersed across the state, and studying two
geographically distant regions rather than two neighboring areas allowed me to compare and
contrast features of the network arising out of very different economic, political, ecological,
topographical, and social conditions. Figure 3 shows the seven IVAN sites and an eighth that is
planned to begin operating in Sacramento; Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley are
circled. One of the limitations of the study is that I do not include a site in the Central Valley,
which includes the Fresno, Kings, and Kern IVAN sites. That region is well-known for poor air
quality from a variety of sources of pollution, including agriculture, diesel truck emissions, and
oil and gas extraction, and including one site in the Central Valley would have made it possible
to offer a more comprehensive look at the range of concerns in environmental justice
communities in California. For the purposes of this study, however, I chose to sacrifice some
breadth for the additional depth I gained by focusing on just two sites.
Gathering Data
I used a combination of purposive sampling and snowball sampling to select interview
participants from each of the two Environmental Justice Task Forces to interview. The
interviews took place between January and March of 2017. I conducted 16 interviews with 18
participants with a response rate of 100 percent. In two instances, individuals whom I had
planned to interview requested that another staff person join the interview. The interviews ranged
in length from 42 minutes to 1 hour and 50 minutes with an average duration of 66 minutes.
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Most interviews were conducted face to face; however, one interview with a community member
from San Francisco was conducted entirely over the phone and two other interviews with
participants in the Bayview Hunters Point IVAN were initiated in person and completed over the
phone due to time constraints. The quality of the interviews conducted over the phone was
consistent with that of the in-person interviews, perhaps because all the participants and I had
previously met face to face before our phone conversations.
Among public agency staff, I planned to interview the government problem-solver, the
government Task Force chair, and the public agency staff member who has attended the most
IVAN meetings. In Bayview Hunters Point, however, I learned that the Task Force is
community-led, so there is neither a government Task Force chair nor a government problemsolver. There are, however, many public officials who regularly attend Task Force meetings and
participate actively. Therefore, in choosing public agency staff to interview, I looked for
participants who work at different levels of government and have attended all or nearly all of the
Task Force meetings. The interviewees included: two EPA officials who oversee the cleanup of
the Hunters Point Navy Shipyard Superfund site; three San Francisco Department of
Environment Environmental Justice Program staff members; and one employee of the State
Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) whose involvement with IVAN dates back to
its inception. In the Imperial Valley, state government officials play a more active role in
facilitating meetings and problem-solving, so the selection of participants matched my selection
criteria. Two of the government interviewees work for the DTSC/Imperial Certified Unified
Programs Agency (CUPA), which is a state office that performs both a state and a local function.
In California, CUPAs coordinate a variety of local environmental protection enforcement
functions into a single program; they are usually administered locally, but in Imperial County the
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state agency runs the CUPA (DTSC 2010). Among government staff in Imperial, I interviewed:
the problem-solver, who is an employee of the DTSC/Imperial CUPA; the government chair,
also with DTSC/Imperial CUPA, and an employee of the California Air Resources Board
(CARB), who among government agency staff has attended the most IVAN-Imperial meetings
since January 2014 (which is as far back as I was able to obtain attendance records).
Among community organization staff, I planned to interview the community problemsolver, who is the person within the convening organization responsible for following up on
complaints filed by community members. In Bayview Hunters Point the convening organization
is Greenaction, and in the Imperial Valley it is Comité Civico del Valle (CCDV). Greenaction is
a grassroots organization that builds community power and advocates for environmental justice
in low-income communities across the United States (Greenaction 2017). Based in Brawley,
California, CCDV’s mission is to “improve access to health services, research, community
service programs, and environmental justice to disadvantaged communities by way of education,
capacity building, and civic participation” (CCDV 2016). I intended the second community
organization interview to be with the Community Task Force Chair. In early conversations with
staff at both Greenaction and CCDV, I realized that the roles of the staff members at the
convening organizations in the EJ Task Force meetings are less clearly defined than I had
anticipated. Nevertheless, there were two staff members at each organization whose were clearly
the most involved with IVAN, based on the duration of their involvement and the frequency with
which they attend Task Force meetings, and so at each site those were the two whom I selected
for participation in this study.
I used several methods to select community members to interview, including asking for
suggestions from Greenaction and CCDV staff members, acting on suggestions from residents to
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reach additional interviewees, and identifying particularly heavily involved participants in my
field observations in November 2016. Because the pool of regular participants from the
community is quite small, many of the suggestions made to me were the same names I identified
through participant-observation at the November Task Force meeting. In Imperial, where the
Task Force has been meeting monthly for eight years, there were some community members
who used to attend but no longer come to meetings. I opted to interview currently active
participants so that I could consider their responses in light of their participation in Task Force
meetings, and vice versa. I interviewed two participants in Bayview Hunters Point, one a longtime resident of the Bayview neighborhood and the other a resident of Little Hollywood, a
neighborhood just south of Bayview Hunters Point. In the Imperial Valley, I interviewed three
residents, one of whom lives in the tiny desert community of Ocotillo, another who resides in the
town of Imperial, and a third who lives just south of the border in Mexicali.
In-depth, semi-structured interviews are issue-oriented conversations that assume “that
individuals have unique and important knowledge about the social world that is ascertainable and
able to be shared through verbal communication” (Hesse-Biber 2017: 106). In this study, reasons
for and ways of participating in IVAN varied widely, so interviews allowed multiple
perspectives to emerge regarding a defining characteristic of IVAN’s Taskforces: partnerships
between community organizations and public agencies. Topics discussed during the interviews
included the purpose of IVAN; the history of IVAN in the region where the interview is taking
place; how participants became involved with IVAN; the roles and responsibilities of residents,
community organization staff, and public agency staff; the benefits and challenges of partnership
with public agencies; and perceptions of the ways that partnership furthers or constrains progress
toward environmental justice. Although I prepared an interview guide with the same set of pre-
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determined questions for each interviewee, the order in which I asked those questions varied
depending on the form each conversation took. Several participants seemed to feel most
comfortable with a more structured interview format that moved straight through the interview
guide as planned, whereas in other interviews, the conservation took a more meandering path
toward addressing the questions I had in mind.
Participant observation in the Environmental Justice Task Force meetings allowed me to
venture a bit into the “social worlds” of the IVAN networks and provide “thick descriptions” of
the interactions among stakeholders in the network (Hesse-Biber 2017: 183). Between November
2016 and February 2017, I attended three of the two-hour-long monthly Task Force meetings in
Bayview Hunters Point and three in the Imperial Valley. The Bayview Hunters Point meetings
take place the third Wednesday of each month. They alternate monthly between afternoon and
evening meetings. The afternoon meetings take place at Southeast Community College in the
Alex Pitcher Room, a cavernous basement meeting space often used for community functions.
Evening meetings, a new addition this year to try to better accommodate residents’ schedules,
convene at the historic Bayview Opera House, which is a neighborhood landmark originally built
in 1888 as a cultural center for what was then the slaughterhouse hub for the city. In Imperial
Valley, the local DTSC office in El Centro hosts the meetings on the third Thursday of each
month from three to five in the afternoon. At Task Force meetings, I observed as community
members, community organization staff, and public agency staff convened to discuss ongoing
efforts to improve environmental conditions, listen to and discuss presentations from various
agencies, and to review recently filed complaints. I gained permission to record the January and
February meetings in Imperial County and the February meeting in Bayview Hunters Point;
during the meetings prior to my receiving that permission, I took notes by hand.
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Usually, ethnographic research involves extensive observation and participation among
the people being studied; one limitation of my research is that the duration of my participant
observation was brief. Participant observation supplements interview data and document analysis
with descriptive detail and an illustration of the social dynamics at play during Environmental
Justice Taskforce meetings. Doing one round of participant observation before conducting
interviews allowed me to better understand the basic structure of IVAN and to develop at least an
intuitive understanding of the working relationships among participants. This first round of
participant observation raised questions that I was able to then incorporate into my interview
guide. I have been cautious, however, not to draw broad conclusions about participants’
perspectives based solely on these relatively brief periods of observation.
In addition to formal participant observation at Task Force meetings, I have had several
opportunities to get to know IVAN participants in more informal settings. In January, two
community members met me in El Centro and gave me a tour of the area so that I could see and
experience for myself some of the concerns they face in their daily lives. We drove by the local
high school, which is surrounded by agricultural fields on three sides and backs onto a major
interstate. We also drove to an illegal dump site on private property containing hundreds of
fluorescent tubes, old CPUs, tires with standing water inside, and vast quantities of other debris.
We took photos and filed a report on one of the community members’ phones. After the IVANImperial meetings in January and February, I joined residents and government agency staff at the
Denny’s across the interstate from the DTSC office. This dinner is a monthly ritual where
conversations started at the meeting hours earlier are continued on a more informal basis. From
my perspective, these experiences in the Imperial Valley built some trust between me and the
Task Force members. They also shifted me from my standpoint of being largely an observer to
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one in which I had at least some of the experience of being a participant at the Task Force and in
the community. Although I did not have the same opportunity to get to know participants in the
Bayview Hunters Point Task Force in informal settings, simply being present at meetings and
speaking casually with participants before and after meetings was useful in building rapport and
establishing a foundation of trust before conducting interviews.
Document analysis provided additional information to help describe the structure,
function, and development of IVAN. Publicly available documents published by CalEPA and the
DTSC; research conducted for IVAN suggesting performance measures; and documents
published by the communications that coordinate IVAN (Greenaction in Bayview Hunters Point
and Comité Civico del Valle in Imperial), offered important contextual information. In addition,
Task Force minutes for meetings in Bayview Hunters Point prior to my participant observation
extended my understanding of the network; however, meeting minutes are not taken in the
Imperial Valley. Finally, I used the attendance records from the IVAN-Imperial meetings from
2014 through 2016 to track who has attended those meetings over the years so that I could verify
statements from current participants about who tends to attend or not attend IVAN meetings.
Collectively, these documents helped explain the need for IVAN in these regions and describe
the context of environmental justice efforts within which IVAN is situated, both within state
government and among community organizations and grassroots activism.
Analysis
Interviews and participant observation were recorded and transcribed to maximize efforts
to represent various perspectives fairly and accurately. Two interview participants preferred that
their interviews not be recorded, so I took extensive notes on my laptop during those interviews
to capture as much as possible of what was said. A grounded theory approach informed my

37

process of inductive analysis; however, I also drew on theory developed in the literature on
environmental justice to raise questions about IVAN and help develop deductive categories
within my major topics. Grounded theory, as Hesse-Biber (2017: 316) notes, “starts from an
engagement with the data and ends with a theory that is generated from or grounded in the data.”
This means that the researcher engages with the data to generate meaning rather than working
purely deductively. I began content analysis using open coding to develop major topics and
categories within those topics; the process of categorization was also informed by existing
theory. As a consistent set of categories and themes emerged, I began selectively coding but
remained open to the possibility that new categories or themes might emerge late in the process
of content analysis.
As I developed my analysis, I looked carefully for opportunities to compare and contrast
the perspectives of participants in different IVAN sites and the perspectives of actors playing
different roles within each network. For example, I paid attention to whether patterns emerge in
the responses of public agency staff regarding the purpose of IVAN and how their responses
compared with responses of residents and of community organization staff. This analysis
supported the elaboration of existing theory on the role of collaboration and public participation
in environmental justice, which helped me respond to the question of how innovative models,
particularly in the realm of monitoring and enforcement, can contribute to movement toward
environmental justice.
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RESULTS
Participation
Understanding how Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) addresses
environmental justice first necessitates a description of who participates, what that involves, and
why they take part. There are two primary ways for people to utilize IVAN: by filing complaints
on the IVAN website, and/or by joining Task Force meetings. In this project, I interviewed
people who attend Task Force meetings. In some cases, those active in the Task Force also file
complaints online; however, there are also people who file complaints online who do not attend
meetings. Because their complaints are anonymous, it is not possible to follow up with those
who report online to learn more about who they are and their motivations for reporting. Thus, the
description that follows applies to participants in the Task Force component of IVAN, not the
online complaint system.
Bayview Hunters Point
Attendance at the Task Force meetings ranged from roughly 30 people to over 40 in the
short window when I observed. I attended two afternoon meetings at Southeast Community
college, in November and in February. About 30 people attended both the November meeting
and the February meeting. In January, at an evening meeting at the Bayview Opera House, over
40 people were present despite a soaking rain. At two of the three meetings, government
agencies were the most heavily represented; only at the February meeting did non-profit
organization representation match the government presence. In November and January, nonprofit organizations comprised the second-largest group, and residents not working as staff or
interns for non-profit organizations made up the smallest group. In February, eleven government
employees from city, regional, state, and federal agencies attended. Eleven staff members and
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volunteers with non-profits attended, representing Greenaction, the San Francisco Conservation
Corps, the San Francisco Parks Alliance, Literacy for Environmental Justice (LEJ), and
Manylabs, an organization that promotes the use of mathematics and data science to fuel civic
change (Manylabs 2017). Of the five residents present, two noted that they live in communities
just south of Bayview Hunters Point, and at least two of the remaining three live in Bayview
itself.
The community organization and resident categories overlap significantly. I distinguish
between the two based whether they introduced themselves at the beginning of Task Force
meetings as residents or as being affiliated with an organization. Of the two staff members from
Literacy for Environmental Justice who were present, one grew up in Bayview Hunters Point. Of
the four participants at the meeting affiliated with Greenaction, at least one, Marie Harrison, is a
resident of Bayview Hunters Point, and her involvement in IVAN is both professional and
deeply personal. As she explained during our interview, “I absolutely love this community. I
love the people in this community. They’re not all wonderful, beautiful people and they’re not all
horrible, ugly people either. Have you ever just loved a community?”
Similarly, at least three of the five attendees who self-described as “residents” during
introductions at the beginning of the meeting are also active in at least one organization related to
environmental justice. For example, one resident participates in Huntersview Mothers & Fathers
Committee for Health and Environmental Justice, which educates and empowers public housing
tenants about environmental health problems facing the Bayview neighborhood. Another, Dr.
Ray Tompkins, summarized his involvement in the community this way:
I lend my assistance to Greenaction. I'm the chair of the African American Health Equity
Council on the Environment; I work with Clean Air Health Alliance … I sit on the
Bayview Hunters Point Advisory to the [Southeast Health] Clinic, run by the San
Francisco Health Department because I look at the environmental side of the health … I
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used to sit on the Navy's Remediation Advisory Board on the cleanup of the Shipyard. I
chaired the Technical Committee for six years; I was on the Board for twelve.

In addition to his participation in IVAN, Tony, a resident of a community called Little
Hollywood that lies south of Bayview Hunters Point, founded the Little Hollywood
Improvement Committee. The residents who attend EJ Task Force meetings regularly are
involved in other advocacy in addition to IVAN.
For residents, the primary motivations for engaging in IVAN are their concerns about
quality of life, human health, and environmental justice. For example, Marie, who works with
Greenaction but is also a resident of the community, described how her early advocacy was tied
to her grandson’s asthma, which led her to question what was causing him to become ill. “And
then I realized,” she said, “Well damn, the PG&E power plant was right here. And this stovepipe
that was pumping out all the particulates was right here. His bedroom window, which was right
across the street, was right here.” After a harrowing experience at the hospital, she explained, “I
don’t know what it did to me, but it did something to me, so it caused me to vigorously start
going after PG&E.” Another community resident, Leaotis, explained what drives him to attend
during the November Task Force meeting, saying, “Sometimes I get tired of coming to meetings.
Sometimes I get frustrated because I feel like we’re not getting no damn where. This is why I do
this shit, because of people dying of cancer. Even if they don’t care about us, we got to care
about ourselves.” For both these participants, deep concerns about the human health impacts of
pollution, for themselves and for their neighbors, drove them into advocacy roles and to IVAN.
Environmental racism is a strong motivator for Dr. Tompkins, who is involved in a wide
range of environmental health advocacy organizations. When asked why he attends IVAN
meetings, he expressed a sense of responsibility, explaining that “it would be a betrayal” of his
parents, who fled racial violence in Louisiana in the 1930s, and of civil rights activists who put
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their bodies at risk for their cause, were he not to maintain optimism about the fate of the black
communities in San Francisco. He said simply, “There’s got to be something better. I just can’t
accept this shit.” Finally, Tony, who lives in Little Hollywood, got involved with IVAN because
it was a vehicle to address a problem in his community, but, he said, “I knew from the beginning
that if I was going to get some help, I was going to need to support them first … So I gave, and
then they gave back, and I’m still giving back. And I’m committed to the larger picture of what’s
good for the community even though it’s not necessarily my problem.” Although Tony and Dr.
Tompkins feel personally compelled to remain involved with IVAN for slightly different
reasons, both are committed to working for the public interest, just like Marie and Lee.
The government employees I spoke with have all been attending Task Force meetings
since establishment of the Bayview Hunters Point IVAN. In some cases, they participate because
their departments have supported the development of IVAN statewide, as in the case of DTSC,
and in other instances, because Greenaction reached out to the agency directly. Three staff
members at SFE met with Greenaction prior to the 2015 launch of IVAN to help them plan, and
they try to send one or more staff from their EJ team to each meeting. Roger Kintz, state
Environmental Justice Coordinator for DTSC, explained that he is the designated liaison from his
department to the Bayview Hunters Point Task Force “to provide technical support and
representation on toxics issues and environmental justice issues, and issues related to DTSC.”
Two U.S. EPA employees who attend Task Force meetings regularly explained that they became
involved in IVAN initially because they were requested to by Marie Harrison of Greenaction:
“she’s a well-respected person in the community, and so she was pulling all her strings to make
sure that the Task Force had the right people in it to help the community through any issues that
they might bring up,” one of them said.
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Modes of participation in IVAN vary among individuals. Unlike in the example provided
by Lee (2005), there are no formal partnering agreements between government agencies and
Greenaction or CCDV, nor do parameters exist describing how residents or non-profit
organization representatives should participate. Despite the lack of formal partnering agreements,
all the interviewees for this project expressed an intent to stay involved with IVAN. Government
agency representatives described their role as giving input, trying to help respond to reports,
occasionally advising Greenaction about how to route complaints to the correct agencies, and
sharing information with community members. During Task Force meetings, most government
representatives focus more heavily on sharing technical information and responding to questions.
A few others participate both by sharing information and by directly addressing some of the
structural and functional challenges associated with IVAN, such as the division of roles and
responsibilities between government and private citizens, and how government can build trust
among communities.
Greenaction facilitates Task Force meetings. To prepare, a team of Greenaction staff and
volunteers look at the IVAN reports filed online between meetings each month and ensure that
they are routed to the proper regulatory agencies for follow-up. In addition, a volunteer with
Greenaction takes meeting minutes, which are posted online each month; the Bayview Hunters
Point IVAN is the only site of the seven in California that posts meeting minutes monthly,
providing a public record and affording the wider community an opportunity to stay current on
what is happening in Task Force meetings even if they cannot attend. Other non-profit
organizations’ participants mostly observed quietly during the months that I attended IVAN
meetings, although meeting notes indicate that LEJ has participated vocally in the past,
especially when the topic of illegal dumping has arisen during meetings.
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Three community members participated most vocally during my observations of IVAN
meetings in San Francisco. One of those three explained to me, “My role has evolved from one
of coming there with my own problems for our area and trying to get them solved to...we made a
lot of progress on those, and now my role has morphed into trying to be a peacemaker and trying
to be a unifier among a bunch of people that don't all agree.” When I asked him to elaborate on
why he needed to be a peacemaker, he explained that one of his concerns is that “the few
[community members] that do come down either have an axe to grind, and it might be a very
legitimate concern that they have, but they're not always tremendously reasonable about how
they present that concern.” He explained how he plays the peacemaker role as follows: “I try to
call everybody on their bullshit. I try to do it very diplomatically, I try to be positive to all people
and respectful of all different sides, and that takes a lot of time and effort. I've tried to make this
case that the government people are not the enemy and they're not just sent here by their boss to
bullshit us.” While this resident focuses on changing the tenor of meetings to facilitate
collaborative problem-solving between community and government, the two other community
members emphasize government accountability through their participation. For example, during
a conversation in February about a cleanup of a toxic site along the waterfront in Southeast San
Francisco that advocates perceived to be botched, one of them said, “We can’t allow this stuff to
happen. It might be a small thing to some people, but it’s not small to us. Every bit of it matters,
because there’s lives at stake.” Community participation varies more in tone and substance than
that of non-profit organizations or government.
In every interview, Task Force members in San Francisco said that low participation
among community members is a challenge facing IVAN in Bayview Hunters Point. Interviewees
offered several explanations to account for low reporting rates and low meeting attendance,
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including competing reporting systems and additional issues that compete for their time and
attention, lack of awareness of IVAN, fear of reporting, and the normalization of environmental
health hazards. Roger Kintz with DTSC explained, “Bayview Hunters Point doesn’t have a very
high reporting rate, even though there are a lot of illegal dumping and things happening here. I’m
not quite sure why that’s low. There’s competition with other government agency reporting
systems, and I also think the community itself hasn’t had an opportunity and education to
understand how to use IVAN effectively.” One U.S. EPA official who is a Community
Involvement Specialist also noted that residents have multiple issues competing for their time
and attention: “The community, you know, the ones who are active, they go to a lot of meetings
… So they all came when IVAN first started, but then the numbers started getting smaller and
smaller,” she said. This perspective was corroborated by another interviewee who noted that, in
an environment of rapid gentrification, the major concerns of many Bayview Hunters Point
residents are housing and jobs. She also noted that opinions differ about who should be
responsible for increasing participation. She explained that government participants are
concerned about the lack of turnout at meetings and want organizers on the ground to engage
residents, whereas Greenaction wants agencies to find ways to increase community participation.
The division of labor between government and community-based organizations remains
contested, at least regarding this responsibility. Finally, another SFE staff member pointed out
that fear and the normalization of hazards after years of neglect can be barriers to participation.
He explained, “A lot of people are scared to complain. They feel like there might be retaliation
from their landlord, or they’ve gotten so used to dealing with conditions that they just don’t
expect that anything will be done, so why bother complaining?” Lacking a sense of efficacy,
people are less likely to engage.
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Imperial County
The Task Force meetings in Imperial tend to be much smaller gatherings than the ones in
Bayview Hunters Point. Based on sign-in sheets at the DTSC office in El Centro, where
meetings take place, an average of twelve people participate in person. Several more government
staff typically join in over the phone, including a representative from U.S. EPA Region 9. Three
community members attend regularly, as do two to four staff members from Comité Civico del
Valle (CCDV). Humberto Lugo of CCDV and Roger Vintze from DTSC co-chair the Task
Force. Since 2014, local government has participated with diminishing frequency. In 2016, two
staffers from the County Agricultural Commissioner’s Office comprised the entirety of local
government participation. Other local agencies that have sent staff in the past include the
Imperial County Air Pollution Control District (APCD), the Imperial Irrigation District, the
County Public Health Department, and Imperial County Planning and Development Services.
The most frequent participants from state agencies are DTSC, the Colorado River Water Quality
Control Board, and the California Air Resources Board (CARB). A staffer from the office of the
California State Assembly member from the 56th District, of which Imperial County is part, also
frequently attends IVAN-Imperial meetings, as does an employee of Spreckels Sugar, which has
a factory in the county.
The community members who participate in IVAN-Imperial see it as a vehicle for change
in a region where they perceive government is not typically responsive to their concerns. Anita, a
resident of the town of Imperial, has been active in her community since the early 1990s and has
worked with CCDV to protect the environment and public health. She explained that IVAN “has
been like a channel for us to let the world know, or the state in this case, because here in the
County we’re just not being heard.” Edie, another resident, told me, “I've spent since 1977 when
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I moved to Imperial County dealing with environmental health and environmental justice and
one disaster after another in Imperial County.” Her work has included protecting Native
American sacred sites from development projects, as well as fighting hazardous waste landfills,
waste incineration sites, a cyanide heap leach open pit gold mine, and a project called Wind
Zero, which would have been a military and law enforcement training site within hundreds of
feet of homes in Ocotillo, the tiny desert community thirty miles west of El Centro where Edie
lives. “So, I just have learned a whole lot more than I ever wanted to know about zoning and
planning, and when and why so many regulations are just ignored,” she told me. For her,
participating in IVAN with representatives from the state and federal government and “having
people care, because we don't get the level of care from people in departments in Imperial
County that you would expect to care,” allows her to stay “hopeful that there will be changes.”
As in San Francisco, government agency participants were either requested to do so by
CCDV or assigned the task by their supervisors to attend IVAN meetings. All three government
agency staff members interviewed for this project described personal fulfillment derived from
working with IVAN. The government co-chair, Roger, said that although competing priorities
such as completing all of the inspections for the DTSC/Imperial County Certified Unified
Program Agency (CUPA) can make devoting enough time to IVAN a challenge, “If I’m in the
office, I’ll be at the Task Force meeting, because it has a lot of value to me. I really like it, and I
know I don’t spend enough time on it.” Raquel, the problem-solver for IVAN-Imperial explained
that for her, “I thought maybe this might be the way to see the changes that I want for the
Valley.” She described taking a course in college that awakened her to the environmental justice
challenges facing communities in Los Angeles and returning home to Imperial County to learn
through IVAN that many of the same issues occur there. She expressed a sense of efficacy and
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responsibility, saying, “I want to fight for people who can’t fight for themselves.” Finally,
Hector, a CARB Air Pollution Specialist told me, “I enjoy this.” Later in our conversation he
told me, “Once you establish friendships, then it’s like you’re doing it for your friends.”
Whereas in San Francisco, a staff member or volunteer from Greenaction facilitates the
meetings, in Imperial County the problem-solver, a DTSC/Imperial CUPA staff member, acts as
facilitator. The problem-solver reviews complaints filed during the previous month and reports
back to the Task Force about where she forwarded the complaints and what response she got
from the agency she contacted. Throughout the meetings in Imperial, participants voice questions
and suggestions frequently. For example, in a discussion in January 2017 about a complaint
related to truck idling in a residential neighborhood, a CCDV staff member who lives in the
neighborhood where the trucks were idling asked Hector, an air pollution specialist with CARB,
if he could send the Task Force a picture of the sticker that indicates certain trucks have
permission to idle. Hector described the sticker and clarified, “[this occurred] in front of a
residential area, so they shouldn’t be idling at all, regardless of whether they have a sticker or
not.” In the exchange that followed, a DTSC employee and a resident asked a series of clarifying
questions about CARB’s Truck and Bus regulation. Following this, the problem-solver herself
asked, “So if I get complaints like this in the future, should I send them to APCD?” Hector
explained that CARB does not have enough inspectors in the state to send them out in the
evenings, but that some local entities have a Memo of Understanding (MOU) with CARB,
allowing the local body to issue citations on some of the CARB regulations. He suggested, “You
guys can pressure the entity in Imperial County to sign an MOU with us.” A community member
joined in, “Well, what happened to your drones? … They’re only $100 … They come with a
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camera,” suggesting slyly that CARB could extend their enforcement capacity by using drones to
investigate complaints.
The conversation soon returned to the challenges of getting APCD to respond to pollution
complaints and CARB’s small number of inspectors, before the group moved on to the next
complaint. In this instance, the Task Force discussed a specific complaint, participants (including
both government and residents) gained clarity on the relevant rules and processes related to
enforcement in that case, and a suggestion was made about how the Task Force could act to
improve enforcement on similar issues in the future. As in most discussions in Imperial, at least
half of the people in the room participated in the conversation. The conversations in Imperial
often lack the sense of urgency that propels meetings in Bayview Hunters Point, but the high
level of engagement of participants allows the Task Force to be a space where government,
residents, and community-based organizations learn from one another and collectively
brainstorm novel potential solutions to environmental problems.
In interviews, participants elaborated on how they participate in Task Force meetings.
Hector explained, “Most of the time I participate with issues that are air-related because it’s my
area of expertise. But I do know about other areas, and I will participate when other things
happen…if I find that nobody attended from a certain agency and there’s information that needs
to be given to the other agency, then I will take it to the other agency.” Ray, the community
member who asked where CARB’s drones are, wants to hold government accountable. He told
me, “I introduce myself as a trouble-maker” and explained that he plays that role because he sees
government agencies claiming they lack the funds to send inspectors out and unable or unwilling
to conduct inspections on weekends or holidays, and “that mentality just drives me nutso!” He
feels his role is to “put the knife in ‘em, because they’re not being responsive to their
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constituents.” The staff members from CCDV mostly observe, aside from the co-chair,
Humberto. Sometimes, however, they share information about the reports that have been filed
that either they submitted themselves or that families they work with have filed.
As in San Francisco, most interviewees acknowledged that low participation is a
challenge for IVAN-Imperial. In contrast to Bayview Hunters Point, though, Task Force
members in the Imperial Valley note that while involving residents is difficult, it is equally
challenging to get local agencies to attend IVAN meetings or respond to reports filed through
IVAN. In fact, Luis Olmedo, the founder of the IVAN network and Executive Director of
CCDV, did not cite low community participation as being of concern but did note repeatedly the
importance of boosting the engagement of local agencies. He indicated improvement, however,
when he explained:
At the local level, especially in rural areas [government agencies] get no attention and no
funding. They get no nothing; so people become very bitter … they feel like, ‘You just
come out here to call me out on things, but you never offer me support and money.’ So I
think there’s a sense of that. But I think IVAN over time throughout the years, because
we’ve been very consistent, I think now we see that there’s more willingness at the local
level [in] Imperial.

Other participants in the Task Force, however, take a less sanguine perspective. A resident told
me, for example, “[T]he fact that county department heads don't regularly come to EJ Task Force
meetings probably says something about how they feel. Because for them it's like, a 5- or 10minute drive, and yet there are people that come from Sacramento, San Francisco, LA, San
Diego … that come to the meeting because they care.” In addition to the challenge of cajoling
local agencies to participate in meetings, Task Force members find that those agencies remain
unresponsive to reports filed through IVAN. For example, one Task Force member said, “The
Air District here is not very responsive. And that’s an agency that we wish … I mean, they’ve
been to our Task Force meetings before. But that’s an agency that sometimes, we submit reports
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and we call them directly but they never show up. They’ll say, ‘Oh, we can’t make it. We’re low
on staff.’”
Analysis
Participation looks different in Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley because
of the disparities in size and composition of the Task Forces. The IVAN-Imperial Task Force has
developed an intimacy and group cohesion that the Task Force in Bayview Hunters Point lacks;
yet, the group in San Francisco has succeeded in securing the consistent participation of a much
broader array of government agencies than the group in Imperial County has. The tenor of the
dialogue in San Francisco is more oppositional; there is tension in the room throughout the
meetings, which is acknowledged by government and community members alike. In the Imperial
Valley, relationships appear to be stronger and collaboration in the sense of power-sharing feels
more possible; however, there seems to be no mechanism in place to ensure that the ideas
generated through collaboration align with the goals of the Task Force or to delegate
responsibilities to Task Force members when the possibility of collaborative action arises. For
example, when Hector suggested advocating for the APCD to sign an MOU with CARB, which
could potentially significantly affect the capacity to enforce mobile emissions-related
regulations, his suggestion was neither captured in notes nor did any Task Force member offer to
follow up on it. In both Task Forces, community participation is narrow but deep; relatively few
community members participate in the Task Force, but those who do are consistent and their
contributions reflect extensive knowledge garnered both through personal experience with
environmental health hazards, and through research and interactions with a variety of experts and
agency personnel.
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Concerns about participation point to larger questions about the function of IVAN. Is it
primarily a reporting network that does not see a large volume of use because of competing
government reporting systems, or is it mainly an organizing tool that is under-utilized because
the core participants present at the Task Force meetings have not strategized adequately to
mobilize the community? Should IVAN function as a platform to express and address existing,
clearly defined concerns shared by community members, or is IVAN a forum to define and
refine those concerns with input and support from the community and the additional insight of
government agencies? Perhaps in part because IVAN is a collaborative program, its participants
emphasize different facets of its function and thus ascribe varying significance to the challenge
of low participation. To better understand the value of increasing participation in IVAN and to
begin to talk about strategies to do so, it will be useful to articulate the range of functions that
participants associate with IVAN.
The Functions Of IVAN
Accountability
Luis Olmedo and Bradley Angel, executive directors of CCDV and Greenaction,
respectively, rank increasing the accountability of government agencies high on the list of the
roles IVAN plays in their communities. For Angel, accountability is the bottom line: “its essence
is an accountability forum. And it’s hard to wiggle out of it,” he explained of the Task Force.
The government agencies, he said, “know controversial stuff comes up and we won’t zip our lips
on it.” When we met in his office the day before the February IVAN meeting, Angel anticipated
that the U.S. EPA would, after agreeing to make a presentation on the latest developments at the
Navy Shipyard, suggest instead that they were open only to answering questions from residents.
He said, “Marie’s probably going to call ‘em up, and I’m sure there’s going to be people yelling
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at ‘em. But at least they’re there, and they have taken some more actions … I mean, communities
will continue to be able to have this direct face-to-face accountability once a month.” Angel
perceives that the accountability starts with the simple fact that government agencies at every
level from city to federal show up at every meeting. “So,” he explains, “their presence makes
them accountable.”
Whereas Angel believes that accountability has increased because government agencies
are showing up for the monthly meetings, Olmedo describes the role of the problem-solver as
central to imposing accountability on regulatory agencies and other government entities. He
explains that after the problem-solver routes a complaint to the appropriate agency, “There is an
expected obligation that the [problem-solver] would do everything in their power to get that
report to the proper agency and then get feedback or get that agency to the table, so that on a
month-to-month basis we eventually get to resolve the problem.” In reality, however, the
problem-solver expressed that not having time built into her work schedule for IVAN makes it
very challenging to do more than make an initial contact with agencies to inform them about
reports that fall under their jurisdiction. Olmedo also explained that IVAN’s functionality as a
reporting tool makes it valuable as an accountability measure: “Let’s say worse comes to worse
and an agency doesn’t respond,” he says. “We’ve got one report sent to them, no response. Ten
reports, same result. Thirty reports. Now we’ve got evidence that … I mean, is this agency just
neglecting their job, neglecting their authority? Abusing their authority? … Does this now merit
some kind of legal action?” No situation involving an agency refusing to respond to reports
submitted through IVAN has escalated to the point of a lawsuit, Olmedo noted; instead, the
problem-solver has worked with agencies to increase their responsiveness.
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Residents echo the emphasis on accountability and the uniqueness of the program’s
ability to capture the attention of and generate responsiveness among regulatory agencies. A San
Francisco resident who participates in IVAN explained that the program is “holding [regulatory
agencies] more accountable than they get held in general, and holding them more accountable to
this particular community that’s been systematically abused.” He continued, “You can actually
put a face to someone that cares about your problem, and if it’s not dealt with you can discuss it
with them and see what’s it going to take to turn up the heat to get some action over here? And
you can’t get that anywhere else.” Another Task Force member, a long-time resident of Bayview
Hunters Point explained why having so many regulatory agencies in the same room creates
accountability. He described finger-pointing between the agencies this way: “I get to get ‘em all
in one room, and ‘Oh, it’s his fault!’ ‘It’s his fault!’ I don’t want to hear this shit. All of you get
together and let’s solve the damn thing.” Later, explaining the effect that IVAN has had on
participants, he said, “It’s accountability. Accountability. Don’t try and bullshit me. I understand
you’re trying to keep a job. But don’t bullshit me.” In Imperial County, too, residents credit
IVAN with introducing a sense of accountability among at least some regulatory agency
officials. One participant explained that IVAN is “beginning to let people know ‘we’re
looking.’” Another explained that the main point of IVAN is to address “this issue of not being
accountable to us” and that she can tell regulators are paying attention to IVAN because “when
we submit these reports, we ask for accountability. We ask, okay, what did you do about this? …
It’s not just submitting the report, it’s what comes after.”
The government employees interviewed for this study were less likely than Greenaction
and CCDV staff and residents to describe accountability as a key function of IVAN’s work. In
San Francisco, out of the six government participants in interviews, just one described fostering
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accountability as one of the most important roles IVAN plays. In the Imperial Valley, out of
three government interviewees, two mentioned accountability, but neither described it as central
to IVAN’s work. Accountability appears to manifest differently between the two regions, which
is likely because of the rates of government participation in the two regions. In Bayview Hunters
Point at the February Task Force meeting, government attendees included representatives from
one federal, one state, and four local agencies: the U.S. EPA, the California DTSC, The
Department of Public Works, SFE, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District, and the San
Francisco Public Utilities Commission. An employee of CARB and a San Francisco Department
of Public Health employee also frequently attend. In the Imperial Valley, by contrast, there were
just two state agencies and one federal agency represented at the February meeting: the DTSCImperial CUPA, CARB, and the U.S. EPA. In the past the Regional Water Quality Control
Board has participated as well. The broad participation in San Francisco allows residents to hold
government accountable by asking them directly what they have done to address the
community’s concerns. In Imperial, the problem-solver is the conduit through which
communication passes from the community to the agencies in whose jurisdictions potential
violations occur, and her capacity to demand accountability is limited by the voluntary nature of
her role.
The problem-solver in the Imperial Valley said that she thinks IVAN “gives people, other
agencies, an inclination to find a resolution or to investigate. Because they know that IVAN has
already seen it and the community can see it. So, they know that this is happening and
[community members] expect some sort of resolution.” Another government employee and
founding member of IVAN in the Imperial Valley used stronger language, asserting, “With
IVAN you have really a disinterested third party now basically sticking their nose into the
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business to make sure that the issues are being addressed in a transparent manner.” In most cases
in the Imperial Valley, the problem-solver forwards reports to local entities that do not
participate in Task Force meetings, such as the County Department of Environmental Health,
city governments, or APCD. Although both individuals asserted that IVAN increases
accountability, one of them also noted that “you definitely have a lot of hesitation on the part of
the local agencies, because they believe that they have existing reporting systems that are
perfectly capable of handling whatever IVAN can provide.” This hesitation affects whether
complaints filed through IVAN are resolved. For example, at the January IVAN-Imperial
meeting, the problem-solver mentioned that she had forwarded a complaint to the County
Department of Environmental Health but that “they’re not necessarily the best at keeping in
touch with me.” At the same meeting, a CCDV staff member suggested inviting APCD to the
next IVAN meeting. The problem-solver then said, skeptically, “I’ll call them personally and
invite them next month and see what they say,” and the staff member responded, ‘Yeah, let’s do
that.” The APCD was not present at the meeting the following month when once again the
agency’s unresponsiveness arose as a topic of discussion in response to an agricultural burning
report.
Finally, while residents and non-profit organizations stressed the value of IVAN as a
vehicle to hold government agencies accountable, several government participants in San
Francisco indicated that IVAN could be doing more to foster accountability. All three
participants who shared this observation are environmental justice staff members with SFE,
which does not have regulatory authority. One staff member noted that IVAN’s ability to
increase accountability is tied to its ability to track complaints effectively. This person pointed
out that it is currently difficult to use the IVAN website to track which complaints have been
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resolved, which have not, and whose desk a given complaint is currently sitting on. What is
needed to hold regulatory agency staff accountable, according to this staff member, is a general
inventory of what has been resolved, what is pending, and how long it has been pending. Two
other staff members, interviewed together, explained that they initially expected that Greenaction
would do more at public forums such as the Task Force meetings to push agencies to follow
through on investigations. As one interviewee puts it, “They bring issues to our attention and
after that it’s like they step back … There’s no accountability with us, which I would welcome
… Maybe we could take a tongue-lashing from Greenaction, but right now they’re not really
doing that.” In Bayview Hunters Point, then, which has a very high rate of government
participation, at least some government officials feel that simply being face-to-face with
community members who expect action is not enough to impose accountability. Both a more
user-friendly complaint tracking system and more pressure from Greenaction, they indicated,
would do more to hold government agencies accountable.
Accountability, although among the most frequently discussed functions of IVAN,
remains inconsistently defined across participants in the program, both in Imperial and San
Francisco. In particular, the mechanism by which IVAN demands and attains accountability from
regulatory agency staff is unclear. For example, although in theory the problem-solver in
Imperial County is responsible for following up on complaints so that eventually problems are
resolved, in reality she does not have the capacity to demand follow-through from the parties
responsible for addressing complaints. She explained:
[M]y participation in EJ and the role of the problem-solver is strictly voluntary. It’s not
part of my job description. We have nothing in our Memos of Understanding that relate
to environmental justice, so everything I do is voluntary … I have zero percent [of my
time] allotted for this. So I get the email notification, but when I don’t get the email
notifications, which I haven’t been doing recently, I don’t check IVAN very often.
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If there is no mechanism by which to guarantee that local agencies are held to account by the
community, or by the problem-solver who works on their behalf, then there may be a risk that
despite the sense community members have that they are being heard, the Task Force’s function
is reduced to something closer to placation than to meaningful participation (Arnstein 1969).
This lack of clarity is important because, from the perspective of the advocacy organizations that
sponsor IVAN in the Imperial Valley and Bayview Hunters Point, the ability to insist on
accountable regulatory agencies is part of what makes productive collaboration possible.
Building Relationships and Establishing Trust
The multi-stakeholder work IVAN is able to do is not made possible solely by reminders
that the community will hold government accountable. Community members and government in
both Imperial County and San Francisco described ways in which participating in IVAN has
built a foundation for personal relationships between community members and government
employees and established or, in some cases, re-established trust between community and
government. Meaningful participation of poor and people of color communities in environmental
decision-making is only possible when existing social relations, in which those communities are
marginalized, are disrupted. Building relationships and trust among individuals takes time, but
without it, mistrust and the perception of a lack of respect can hamper productive collaboration
(Lynn 2000). Residents in both the Imperial Valley and Bayview Hunters Point have expressed
distrust of government, and in both regions some agencies have been skeptical and distrustful,
especially early on, of IVAN’s intentions and of the wisdom of involving the public in matters
related to enforcement. The work of building personal investment among Task Force participants
was described in interviews as a precondition of building working partnerships between
government and community.
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Historical and recent breaches of trust in both Bayview Hunters Point and in Imperial
County have left many residents skeptical about the government’s intent to look out for the
community’s best interests. Currently, the most significant broken relationship in Bayview
Hunters Point is between residents of the neighborhood and the U.S. Navy. The Hunters Point
Naval Shipyard was designated a Superfund site and placed on the National Priorities List in
1989, and the cleanup is led by the Navy with regulatory oversight from the U.S. EPA, DTSC,
and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (U.S. EPA 2017). In 2011,
whistleblowers showed that a Navy contractor, Tetra Tech, had falsified soil samples from the
site, underrepresenting the amount of radioactivity in the soil, and possibly dumping radioactive
soil illegally. Residents and advocates want comprehensive retesting of the entire shipyard site
and independent oversight of both the retesting process and the cleanup of illegally dumped
radioactive soil. As Bradley Angel of Greenaction explained during the February Task Force
meeting, “The fact is Tetra Tech was caught in 2011. The agencies didn’t take action until
December 13, 2016. Five years. There is less than no trust … The Navy can say whatever the
hell they want, or EPA with all due respect, or DTSC, we’re not going to trust it.” This study
does not explore explicitly how the community’s experience with the Shipyard has affected
residents’ perceptions of other government agencies, but it seems likely that mistrust toward one
set of government agencies would cast a shadow over perceptions of others as well. The Task
Force has allowed participants to begin repairing the relationships between community members
and government, if not with the Navy specifically.
In the Imperial Valley, residents’ concerns about government were directed mostly
toward agencies at the local level. Because government participation in the Imperial Valley EJ
Task Force comes mainly from state agencies, there is not as much of a need as in San Francisco
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to overcome a significant lack of trust rooted in past experiences. In a discussion at the February
IVAN-Imperial Task Force meeting, one resident said that she would not feel free to speak
openly if county officials were present at a meeting, indicating her mistrust of local government
officials. On the other hand, that resident is among the most vocal and outspoken participants
when state and federal officials are present. Another resident, Anita, explained that she signed
up for air quality alerts from the Imperial County APCD, but she does not trust the data from the
county’s air monitors. On a clear afternoon in January, she showed me the mountain that sits on
the border, called El Centinela in Mexico and Mount Signal in the U.S. She told me, “When
you're able to see El Centinela, you know that that's a good day. I don't need an air monitor. And
they were telling me on the reports that I was getting because I signed up for the website for the
alerts, every day the air was good! And I would just stand outside and see, ‘no, okay, today
they're lying.” Neither resident seems to feel that their local government agencies are responsive
to them or operate with their best interests in mind, yet their trust of state government agencies is
much greater.
In Bayview Hunters Point, residents, more than Greenaction staff or government
employees, elaborated in their interviews on the value of interpersonal relationships between
community members and government staff. For instance, one community member explains, “As
far as the community is concerned [the benefit of the Task Force is] an ability for them to put
faces to faceless agencies, and to humanize these agencies and to realize that they’re not all just
blood-sucking bureaucrats that don’t give a damn about anybody.” Another community member
recalled the meeting that wrapped up just minutes before our interview: “We were developing
respect and mutually working … you’ve got to talk to people before you can change people’s
hearts.” He pointed to a state government employee and a community member who were, aside
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from our interview, the only two people left in the room, and says, “You see, those two are still
talking.” For this participant, building relationships is not just about humanizing government; it
is also about ensuring that he is respected and perceived as technically and scientifically
knowledgeable and capable of understanding complex information. He said, “So yes, they know
that I’m not just a crazy old black man. I really know what the hell I’m talking about.” For him,
IVAN functions in part to “break the stereotypes,” of which he says, “it’s going to take time. It
don’t happen overnight.” Building relationships is, for some, a process of ensuring their
recognition from those by whom they have been felt ignored in the past.
In contrast with San Francisco, in the Imperial Valley all groups – government, nonprofit, and community members – described the value of building personal relationships between
community and government. One state government employee explained, “To me, that’s what
it’s all about: creating relationships with individuals, and then from there you start doing work in
the community.” For him, building relationships means building trust. “I’ve worked to make
them feel like they can ask me anything … So, part of working with these groups is gaining their
confidence. Because … a lot of these communities, they fear government.” He recalled his early
days in the group, saying, “I wanted to get a feel of the group, but they wanted to get a quicker
feel of me … I’ve been out to eat with a lot of these people. And I enjoy this.” The problemsolver in the Imperial Valley expressed a similar degree of dedication saying, “We care about
[the community members] so much that their concerns become our concerns, and we want to be
able to help them, to help them see the resolutions that they want or what they think should be
done.” A CCDV staff member noted the familiar relationships among members of the group,
saying, “I don’t know if you noticed the atmosphere. We’re all friends, you know?”
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The sample size of this study is not large enough to draw broad conclusions about the
way Task Force members participate; however, it should be noted that the Task Force in the
Imperial Valley has been meeting for roughly seven years compared to Bayview Hunters Point’s
year and a half. This difference may account for the greater emphasis on personal relationships in
the responses of participants in Imperial. In addition, the San Francisco Task Force is much
larger than Imperial’s, and the difference in size may affect the ease with which relationships
develop. Finally, in San Francisco the agencies that were skeptical early on nevertheless attended
meetings, whereas in the Imperial Valley, local agencies have been resistant to IVAN and do not
regularly attend Task Force meetings. The regulatory agency officials who do attend are the ones
who are strong supporters of IVAN. This may allow a stronger affinity to emerge among
participants than in San Francisco, where the Task Force has not existed for as long and where
agencies that were initially resistant regularly participate.
Building relationships and developing trust are clearly important preconditions to
functional working relationships. In IVAN, several participants described barriers to building
consistently strong interpersonal relationships within the network. Most significantly, where
there have been the greatest breaches of trust, the agencies involved by and large do not
participate in IVAN. In the meetings I attended in the Imperial Valley, a significant amount of
time was dedicated to discussing complaints that had been sent to the APCD, and, as noted
previously, participants expressed frustration at multiple meetings about the lack of
responsiveness APCD had demonstrated when they reported air quality issues. APCD does not
attend IVAN meetings, and building trust with other agencies does nothing to repair
relationships with APCD. Similarly, in San Francisco, there is time at each meeting spent
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discussing the Navy’s cleanup of the Hunters Point Shipyard, but the Navy declines to attend
IVAN meetings.
An additional barrier to building consistently strong relationship is that government
involvement in IVAN is voluntary, and especially for state government employees who travel
long distances for Task Force meetings, finding the time to sustain relationships with community
members can be a challenge. Nevertheless, some state government employees make the effort
because they value the work IVAN does and want to express their care for the community. One
state government employee who commutes four hours each way from Los Angeles to the
monthly IVAN meetings notes that the ten percent of his time allotted each month for
environmental justice work covers only one leg of the drive, not to mention the meeting itself;
however, he joins Task Force members at the Denny’s in El Centro each month for dinner after
the afternoon meetings. For him, “It’s a little bit of a sacrifice.” Nevertheless, he said, “I’m
willing to do it,” especially, he explained, since he has developed relationships with community
members. Doing work that involves the meaningful participation of residents in communities
disproportionately burdened by pollution requires building trust, and while the voluntary efforts
of particularly committed public servants is admirable, government employees need more time
allotted for environmental justice to make relationship-building, trust-building work possible on
a wider basis.
If IVAN were widely understood as much as a tool for establishing trusting relationships
between community and government as it is as a problem-solving forum for concerns about
environmental protection, perhaps governmental bodies would consider the selection process for
participation in the Task Force more intentionally. Asked whether he feels there are other people
who are willing to put in the kind of time he does on a voluntary basis, the government employee
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described above responded, “I think so. I think there’s a hell of a lot more of us than you would
[think]. It’s just that we’re not given the opportunity.” He explained that in his agency, when a
representative to the IVAN Task Force was chosen, “The selection process in most of these
places is, you over there, we need you to do this. Do you have any interpersonal skills – that’s
not a question. It’s never a question. You just go out there, and it’s just ‘Oh, you speak Spanish?
We need you over there.’” Another government participant employed by a different agency
shared that her preparation to join the Task Force by her department was minimal. It seems that
methods for choosing IVAN representatives in agencies vary, but given the importance of
interpersonal relationships within IVAN, all government entities should take care to select
participants who express interest in and understanding of environmental justice and who have
strong interpersonal skills.
While the first three challenges facing the process of relationship-building – lack of
agency participation, voluntary government participation, and inconsistent methods to select
representatives to IVAN – seem to be the responsibility of government to address, one additional
challenge relates to community members’ communication of pent-up frustration about the
conditions in their communities. In Bayview Hunters Point, four government employees
indicated that there has been tension between community members and government during Task
Force meetings. A DTSC employee, for example, said, “For community members, sometimes
this is one of the first opportunities they have to voice their frustrations and concerns directly to
government people, and it's a captive audience, and so it can be a lot of unloading on them.
That's a challenge.” He went on to note that the unloading of frustrations has occurred every time
an IVAN program has started in a new region, and that over time “the outrage dies down a little
bit, and there’s more productive discussion that happens.” In this way, it seems that the stage of
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venting frustrations might be a necessary step in the process of fostering honest conversation. An
SFE staff member summed up her observations this way: “People still feel the injustice of being
burdened to this level, but at the same time I’ve heard community residents express appreciation
that we’re all there listening.” She added that the general sentiment often seems to be, “I’m mad
as hell but thanks for coming.” While challenging, accepting the expressions of frustrations from
community members and continuing to show up and demonstrate a commitment to listen and to
respond, appear to be vital parts of the development of collaborative relationships capable of
collectively producing stronger environmental protection in heavily impacted communities.
The Production of Environmental Protection
The following sections detail how IVAN functions to produce environmental protection
in the communities it serves. Building relationships and trust and demanding accountability from
government agencies are two sides of the same coin, both essential functions of IVAN. Those
improved relationships, and the expectation from community members of accountable action,
support IVAN’s role as a venue for community members to participate meaningfully in
environmental governance, especially enforcement. IVAN operates as a platform for community
members to express their concerns, elevates or amplifies many of those concerns, and works as a
forum for community, government, and sometimes industry to learn from one another and
collaborate to identify and enact solutions.
IVAN was originally founded to address disparities in environmental quality between the
Imperial Valley and more affluent communities with fewer people of color; the six other sites
established across the state share the same purpose. In IVAN, recognition and meaningful
participation are in part ways to facilitate distributive justice, to ensure environmental benefits
and burdens are shared fairly. So, while one role IVAN plays is to increase the visibility of and
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validate the concerns of community members. It is also important to consider whether and to
what extent IVAN affects the pollution burden borne by the communities where it operates.
Bradley Angel emphasized this dimension of IVAN’s work in Bayview Hunters Point, stating,
“The benefits are we’re getting results. The community’s getting results … It’s getting results
around, whether it’s illegal dumping, idling of trucks, better, more rapid responses to air
violations, to stopping the railroading of the toxic development of the shipyard in its tracks.”
When a problem reported through the IVAN online system leads to action, there are
several possible ways that action can occur. First, just as when reports are filed through agency
reporting systems, a single agency may investigate a potential violation and, if enforcement is
merited, may issue a penalty. In some cases, especially in San Francisco, where the rate of
agency participation is high, the Task Force allows agencies that usually would not collaborate in
a consistent, ongoing manner, to work together more frequently to address challenges brought to
their attention through the Task Force. Although usually the solutions reached through IVAN
require mostly government agency action, sometimes the Task Force itself acts collectively to
address residents’ concerns. In addition, government agencies sometimes express support for
community advocacy on an issue that arises in Task Force discussions. Finally, participants in
the Imperial Valley noted that IVAN sometimes provides opportunities to change government
policies and programs to better serve environmental justice communities.
IVAN as a Platform to Express and Refine Concerns
Participants in nearly every interview in both regions described how the Task Force
functions as a forum where community members can voice their concerns and be heard and
acknowledged. For example, in San Francisco, Roger Kintz of DTSC explained, “what’s unique
about the Task Force is IVAN brings everybody together to talk about the reports … For
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community members, sometimes this is one of the first opportunities they have to voice their
frustrations and concerns to government people.” IVAN offers a space to bring the community
into direct contact with government agencies, and it also, as a U.S. EPA official noted, allows
community members to discuss “any environmental issue in the community,” rather than
addressing one narrow concern as other venues for public participation are more likely to do.
Because it is an open forum, IVAN can be flexible to meet the needs of residents with a broad
range of concerns. Bradley Angel of Greenaction, for example, pointed out the importance of
IVAN’s role as a community forum in the case of the Tetra Tech soil sample falsifications,
saying, “I think IVAN became the only forum, really, where we were able to discuss it … The
Task Force became a forum to push stuff.”
In Imperial County, too, a DTSC/Imperial CUPA employee stated simply, “the
community finally has a platform in which they can go to express their concerns about the
community they live in. I’m not aware of any other platform you have in Imperial County for
that.” His colleague concurred, saying that one of the greatest benefits of the Task Force is that
community members “let their concerns be known” and, whereas in other interactions with
government officials they had not felt heard, “I think here they get the sense [that] we’re here
and we actually listen.” Ray, a resident on the IVAN-Imperial Task Force corroborated those
statements, explaining that IVAN “just personifies what I’ve been thinking. It validates what I’ve
been thinking.” Anita, also a resident from Imperial, said that IVAN “gives some of us the
opportunity to speak up, to let our voices be heard.” By creating a space where residents who
historically have not felt listened to can voice their concerns and be heard and taken seriously by
representatives of government agencies, IVAN offers a measure of recognition justice to
communities disproportionately burdened by environmental pollution. The sense that this role of
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being a community forum is a central component of IVAN is shared in both the Imperial Valley
and Bayview Hunters Point.
IVAN is valuable as a forum not only because it allows community members to voice
their concerns, but also because it provides a space to refine those concerns and figure out how
they should be addressed. A U.S. EPA official explained, “It’s a good forum for people to bring
their concerns and then take somewhat of a collaborative approach to figuring out, ‘Okay, well
what is your actual issue?’ Because … some people, you know, they’re old school, they want to
just talk about it. So, the group in some instances can help refine what the complaint is and figure
out, okay, how can we address this.” She noted that for her, this approach is not entirely new,
because the Superfund division of the U.S. EPA is mandated to do community involvement;
however, that is not the case in other agencies or even other divisions of the U.S. EPA, so she
appreciates how IVAN brings community involvement to other government agencies and
departments.
Multi-Directional Flow of Information
Information-sharing operates in IVAN as a way to demand greater accountability from
government, to elevate community concerns to the attention of government officials, to enable
collective action by the Task Force, and to push for change to policies and programs related to
environmental justice at the local and state levels. The multi-directional flow of information,
over time, builds more comprehensive, shared understandings among stakeholders, which leads
to more nuanced, honest, and productive discussion. Participants in both Task Forces described a
multi-directional flow of information, from community members to government agencies and
from government to community. In addition, several Task Force members indicated that their
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own awareness of the severity of environmental injustice has increased because of their
participation in IVAN.
According to a long-time participant in multiple IVAN networks explained, government
benefits from this information-sharing “by getting community information and community
intelligence.” This notion of community intelligence surfaced repeatedly in interviews, and the
term describes the idea that residents function as an extension of the enforcement apparatus,
reporting potential violations that regulatory agency staff could not catch on their own. For
instance, as one EPA official said, “It's helpful for the community to be the eyes and ears of the
IVAN network.” An Environmental Justice Specialist with SFE explained why broad community
participation in IVAN would be useful, saying, “There might be concerns we haven’t considered
that people raise. There might be areas where something’s going on and we’re not aware of it.”
A resident of Imperial County said, “You have to understand that you have these
agencies…they’re not out there looking for things. But because we live in those communities, we
are those eyes and those ears, and in terms of the resources, we don’t have to invest extra money
because we are already there.” On the other hand, Bradley Angel, while asserting that “there’s
more information flowing” because of IVAN, expressed skepticism as to the degree to which
government agencies have been previously unaware of the challenges facing community
members. He noted, “residents share information, although the government knew about all this,
they just didn’t do anything.”
Community members also learn from government agencies at Task Force meetings, both
through formal presentations about government programs and policies and through the
participation of government officials in conversations about how complaints are tracked and
which agencies have jurisdiction over which types of environmental issues. One government
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official who participates in the Bayview Hunters Point Task Force explained that the “open
forum and discussion” at the meetings allows participants to develop “a better understanding of
local, state, federal responsibilities. I think anyone who comes to these meetings has a different
perspective now,” she explained. In Imperial County, too, a staff member at CCDV emphasized
how the Task Force shifts perspectives: “It’s a great learning place, learning for advocates or
activists, because you get to learn how government sees things…It’s not just necessarily a place
for us to say, are you gonna give them violations and enforce? It’s not that. It’s so the community
can be educated as well, we’re learning what each agency does” (emphasis added). In addition,
in Imperial County the problem-solver, frequently forwards complaints to agencies that do not
participate in IVAN and has herself learned more about how enforcement works in different
local agencies. She told participants at the Task Force meeting in February:
I do send [reports] to the county. They [used to not] respond to me that much … Before I would
just send [reports] to whatever inspector I could remember, and one inspector would say, ‘Oh, no,
it’s not me. It’s the other one,’ and the other one would say, ‘It’s to this one!’ … Now I have a
more direct path … The way they described it is I send it to their admin staff, their admin staff
puts it in their database, their director monitors the database, and then it gets sent to the correct
inspector, because they all do different kinds of jobs. Like this one was sent to their vector
inspector, and another one was sent to their tire inspector.

This instance illustrates the fact that just as community members learn about navigating
government bureaucracy through their participation in IVAN, so do government agency staff.
While nearly everyone I interviewed described the exchange of information between
residents and government officials, several also described IVAN’s role in increasing their
general awareness of the severity environmental justice issues. Of the nine interviewees who
work in government, two, both in the Imperial Valley, indicated surprise at the depth of the
pollution problems in the region. One, an employee of the DTSC-Imperial CUPA, explained, “I
think before [IVAN] I didn’t know this much happened…I’ve seen the ag burns and I’ve seen
the dumping. But I didn’t know there was as much as I do know now.” Similarly, a CARB Air
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Pollution Specialist said, “I knew that there were problems, but I didn’t know that they were this
severe.” In San Francisco, one resident said, “I was never very aware of environmental justice
because unless it’s happening to you, you’re generally not aware of it…so it’s increased my
awareness of that dramatically.” Environmental protection is compartmentalized, and many
whose day-to-day focus is not environmental justice simply may not be aware before
participating in IVAN; similarly, for residents who come to the Task Force to address one
specific issue affecting their lives in mind, IVAN can make them aware that their experiences are
part of a larger pattern of disproportionate pollution burdens in low-income and people of color
communities.
Elevating Concerns
One of the key benefits of a forum for residents to have their concerns recognized and for
varied stakeholders to learn from one another is that such a space increases the likelihood that
government agencies – whether local, state, regional, or federal, or some combination – will be
able to respond to the concerns of the community. As Tony (a resident from San Francisco)
explained, because government agencies have committed to coming month after month to hear
people talk about the problems in the neighborhood, IVAN has “created an environment where
there is more likelihood that a solution could be reached and that those problems could be
addressed, maybe some new ideas might come up or new energy or something.” In addition,
there is a direct link between the sharing of information (which happens more freely when there
is trust among participants) and the strength of enforcement cases. Roger Kintz of DTSC noted,
“The system … provides better quality information-gathering … you get witnesses, photographs,
statements, that can all be used to build a good enforcement case on the reporting framework of
IVAN.” So, IVAN both creates an environment where discussion can lead to solutions and offers
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opportunities for the direct transfer of information from residents to agencies with enforcement
power.
Numerous participants noted that IVAN leads to real outcomes because the forum itself
elevates community-level, and even individual-level, concerns to the attention of city, state, and
federal agencies. That both prompts the agencies themselves to act and, at least in one case, has
put increased pressure on violators to come into compliance with regulations to avoid
enforcement action. In San Francisco, Tony described the power of elevating concerns about the
local recycling company. He recalled that “it took hitting them over the head with a two by four
before they’d sit down and talk to us. Once they saw that it was in their interest to talk to us and
that we were a force to be reckoned with, then they were smart enough to turn around and say,
‘Okay, how do we deal with this?’”
IVAN has also led to material improvement in environmental quality by addressing diesel
idling in Bayview Hunters Point. Bradley Angel recalled, “One of the big issues … is diesel
idling, and there’s never been any government enforcement of those laws. Bayview’s heavily
impacted by diesel. And so, through Greenaction’s long work on that issue and through the Task
Force, the Air District and [CARB] stepped up to work with Greenaction, and [said], ‘Okay,
yeah, we’ll put up some No Idling signs.’” In response to a complaint of diesel idling filed
through IVAN in June 2016, an Air District employee wrote, “Thank you. This complaint came
to the Air District well after the fact, and we could not respond. However, the more idling
complaints we get through IVAN, the more easily we can identify additional areas where idling
is an ongoing problem. The Air Resources Board and the Air District are working together to get
the No Idling signs in place at strategic locations.” Agency representatives continued to report on
progress in developing the signage, and in January 2017 the Air District, CARB, and
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Greenaction held a press conference announcing the installation of twenty-two anti-idling signs
in the Bayview neighborhood (Bay Area Air Quality Management District 2017). The locations
for the signs were determined in collaboration between Marie Harrison, a community organizer
with Greenaction, and CARB. In this example, IVAN functioned as a tool for the co-production
of environmental protection, in which community knowledge and regulatory authority
collaboratively addressed an issue that the community had identified as high-priority.
In the Imperial Valley, all participants expressed the idea that one of the key functions of
IVAN is its role as a forum to elevate the concerns of individuals to agencies that have the power
to respond. One example was relayed by Roger, a DTSC/Imperial CUPA branch chief, who
recalled an instance when many residents were concerned about a wind energy project called
Ocotillo Wind. Members of the Task Force wanted to speak with the North American
Development Bank (NADBank), which was funding the project, so Roger leveraged his role on a
government advisory committee on which NADBank also served to bring NADBank into a
conference call with the Task Force. The purpose of the call was “to try to ensure that NADBank
understood … where these people were coming from with their concerns.” He admitted,
“NADBank was very non-committal in their willingness to listen to issues outside their area of
authority” and hinted at some of his own dissatisfaction with their low level of responsiveness;
nevertheless, his actions on behalf of residents on the Task Force demonstrate the power of the
Task Force not just as a forum to air concerns, but also as a mechanism to elevate those concerns
to decision-makers and regulators with the power to respond.
In Imperial County, residents and CCDV staff emphasized the importance of
participation by state government agencies, explaining that working with the state allows them to
sidestep the power dynamics operating in the local political arena. Luis Olmedo described the
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challenges of navigating the “good old boy network that exists in communities like Imperial,”
explaining that instead of relying heavily on local government participation, “We have more
faith in the state because they’re less vulnerable to local politics, and they’re not as far-reaching
as the federal … I think the state is the key ingredient for us.” Humberto, also a CCDV staff
member, elaborated on the advantages of engaging state agencies rather than local government:
“Local politics sometimes get in the way … a lot of the county people that are in some of the
positions are also the same farmer families, so it’s all tied together. That’s why it’s sometimes
better for us to work with the state agencies. It’s more transparent.” Anita, a resident, told me,
“You have to understand who is in power here, and power, the economic power, is in the hands
of just a few here. We have been run by an ag business industry. There is a lot of money
involved in that … They don’t care about our health.” Anita maintains hope, however, that
through air monitoring data and ongoing advocacy, the local political culture is starting to
change, albeit slowly. In Imperial County, the online reporting platform helps bring local
concerns to the attention of state, regional, and federal agencies, ensuring that the voices of
residents are heard.
Inter-agency Collaboration
In some cases, bringing concerns to IVAN allows those concerns to be heard by a broad
spectrum of government agencies at the same time and prompts collaboration among multiple
agencies. For example, residents from Little Hollywood (just south of Bayview Hunters Point)
came to the Task Force in 2015 with concerns about problems at Recology, the local recycling
facility, including noise, traffic, illegal dumping outside the boundary, and vector control. The
residents had been attempting to engage Recology through letter-writing and media coverage and
had struggled to gain traction; by bringing their concerns to the attention of IVAN, they were
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able to get action from government agencies. A U.S. EPA official recalled, “For a long time they
had been kind of beating down on this company, but I think when the regulators and everybody
got involved … they kind of listened and they started actually implementing some things that
helped the community.” Tony Verreos, a resident who organized the effort, recalled, “Through
IVAN, the different agency people heard the story … and they had four or five different agencies
send their personnel down to Recology … they went down there with like 15 people, all
regulators. You know, there isn’t any business around that wants 15 government sets of eyeballs
running through their business.” Recalling the collaborative effort in response to the Recology
issue, a staff member with SFE suggested that IVAN can be most effective in cases like that one,
when the problems reported are complex and “more agencies need to be involved at multiple
jurisdictions.” She noted that although it is common to see two government agencies pair up
briefly for an inspection, for example, “getting all of them there together to focus on one issue is
not as common.”
Most online reports do not lead to such a large, coordinated response from agencies;
however, most interviewees in San Francisco noted that IVAN seems to have increased the
frequency and regularity of interagency communication. For instance, Lily Lee, the Superfund
Site Manager for the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, explained, “Sometimes we’ll post [on IVAN
Online] and say ‘EPA saw this and we’re referring it to [another] agency,’ and then sometimes
that other agency will say, ‘Yes, I know that this is going on and I’m working on it’ … So one
change is that we never did this before, and now we do do this.” The posts Lee referred to are all
visible to the public through the IVAN website. Her comments seem to indicate that
communication among agencies has increased significantly as a result of the IVAN platform. In
addition, building relationships through IVAN has allowed government bodies to share
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information and resources on an ongoing basis. For example, an Environmental Justice
Coordinator with SFE explained, “I’d say that because of IVAN I feel like I now have a network
of people to contact when some issue comes up … and we have been able to continue to
collaborate on different things or refer things to each other.” When illegal dumping arose as a
significant issue in Bayview Hunters Point, CARB lent SFE a camera to prevent and ideally
catch violators. Another SFE staff member explained, “That may not have happened had they not
heard of the need at those meetings. The ability to hear each other’s issues and problems and be
able to help each other, that has been really good.”
Whereas most Bayview Hunters Point interviewees discussed increased interagency
collaboration as a benefit of IVAN, most interviewees in Imperial did not describe similar
instances. Notably, although residents and government participants emphasized other benefits,
Luis Olmedo, the founder of IVAN and Executive Director of CCDV, did discuss collaboration
among governmental bodies as a benefit of IVAN. In his comments, Olmedo referred to changes
occurring at the state level in CalEPA. Because of the success IVAN had in developing an
integrated reporting system, CalEPA remade their online reporting system in the image of
IVAN’s. Olmedo explained:
We also see that the CalEPA is now developing a model to get those reports to the
different agencies internally, which is improving communication … We also see that
CalEPA is doing these enforcement activities where they’re picking a community and
going as an interagency enforcement and tackling the issues that are out there by getting
every department and every expert to go out and address it as a Task Force … now
you’re taking [a] more comprehensive approach towards environmental protection.

So, where government participants in San Francisco are seeing greater interagency participation
among city departments and between city and state bodies, Olmedo perceives a shift in
CalEPA’s enforcement efforts toward a more coordinated, less compartmentalized approach.
Olmedo credits IVAN, arguing, “Because of the creation of the pressure of IVAN being a
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community-based model in some ways being more efficient in trying to do the government’s job,
government has also tried to step it up.” Indeed, in the press release announcing CalEPA’s new
integrated reporting system, the agency noted, “CalEPA will continue to update the new system
and is working closely with IVAN Online, a network of local environmental reporting systems
that serves more than half a dozen low-income communities across the state, to coordinate the
functions of the two systems” (CalEPA 2016). While participants did not describe a great deal of
inter-agency collaboration occurring to solve problems in Imperial County (most likely because
fewer agencies participate in Imperial County than in San Francisco), Olmedo’s comments
indicate that IVAN’s efforts have gained the attention of the state environmental agency and
generated sufficient pressure to improve its reporting system and shift toward interagency
enforcement.
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CONCLUSION
Residents of Bayview Hunters Point San Francisco juggle concerns about unemployment,
gentrification and rapidly rising housing costs, radioactive fugitive dust from the Hunters Point
Naval Shipyard, illegal dumping in streets and alleys throughout the neighborhood, the impact of
diesel emissions on the lungs of children and the elderly, and the unknown origins and effects of
the daily assault of strange and pungent odors that drift through the streets. In the Imperial
Valley, reports to IVAN frequently address smoke from agricultural burning, illegal dumping
(sometimes of hazardous materials), truck idling, dust from illegal off-road vehicle activity, and
concerns about pesticide application and possible drift into neighborhoods adjacent to
agricultural fields. Both sites include several census tracts that score in the top ten percent of
disadvantaged communities according to California’s environmental justice screening tool,
which considers a range of factors related to population sensitivities and pollution burden
(CalEnviroScreen 2017).
The Identifying Violations Affecting Neighborhoods (IVAN) program was founded in
the Imperial Valley in 2008, and its most recent iteration began operating in 2015 in Bayview
Hunters Point. Residents in San Francisco participate to address the human health impacts of
pollution and concerns about quality of life, and to undo the insidious effects of environmental
racism. In the Imperial Valley, residents see IVAN as a vehicle for change in the community and
a way to have their concerns heard by state regulatory agencies whose work occurs outside the
local power dynamic. Multiple participants cautioned me not to make too much of the novelty of
collaborative approaches to solving environmental justice problems; environmental justice
advocates have always used a wide array of tools, including collaboration when appropriate, to
solve problems affecting communities impacted by pollution. What I argue is both novel and
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unique about IVAN in both locations is its sustained presence over time and its comprehensive
approach to environmental justice problem-solving, which bring together a variety of
stakeholders with wide-ranging perspectives on and knowledge. IVAN functions as a forum to
build trust, increase accountability, educate both government and residents about each other’s
ways of understanding the impacts of pollution, and generate solutions for environmental
protection.
The development of interpersonal relationships and of trust among community-based
organizations, government, and residents contributes to recognition justice for the community.
That means that community members’ accounts of their experiences are met by agency staff with
respect and with a willingness to take action based on their testimony. Recognition facilitates
meaningful participation; when residents feel cared for and listened to, they can engage openly
with government agency staff. In addition, participation occurs on the community’s terms;
whereas meaningful participation sometimes translates to little more than a seat at the table, in
IVAN the community has established the structure of the program and sets the agenda each
month. Government is invited to join a community process each month, rather than the other way
around.
IVAN functions slightly differently in the Imperial Valley than in Bayview Hunters Point
because the two regions present different political opportunities and challenges. In the Imperial
Valley, IVAN more nearly approaches the co-production of environmental protection envisioned
by O’Rourke and Macey (2003), in which regulators work closely with the affected community
to identify challenges and brainstorm solutions. The relationships among stakeholders are strong,
and the level of trust among participants is high. The major limitations of IVAN-Imperial appear
to be a lack of partnering agreements described by Lee (2005) that define the roles and
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responsibilities of participants and the apparent unwillingness or inability of local agencies to
participate. Without clear commitments to action from stakeholders, there remains no clear path
for the ideas generated during meetings, such as inviting APCD to join meetings or applying
pressure to a local entity to sign an MOU with CARB to enforce mobile source air pollution
regulations, to translate into action. The social learning discussed by Balazs and Lubell (2014)
that occurs at the IVAN-Imperial Task Force meetings has the potential to bridge the gap
between procedural and distributive justice by making significant improvements to enforcement;
however, the mechanism to use IVAN to hold local agencies accountable to enforcing
regulations and to enact ideas generated by the Task Force appears to be absent.
In Bayview Hunters Point, many government agencies at the local, state, regional, and
federal level participate consistently. There, the relationships and trust so apparent in the
Imperial Valley are less well-established, partly because of the contentiousness of pollution
problems, such as the ongoing cleanup of the Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. In Bayview Hunters
Point, the primary mechanisms that allow IVAN to make substantive changes to environmental
conditions are accountability and inter-agency collaboration. The process of social learning one
observes in the Imperial Valley occurs unevenly in Bayview Hunters Point; residents do share
information with government agencies and vice versa, but the openness of the dialogue remains
limited by a history of mistrust that persists. IVAN is still new in Bayview Hunters Point, and
relationships may deepen as the program becomes more established and residents see more
results. Nevertheless, as in the Imperial Valley, IVAN in Bayview Hunters Point has built on the
practice of community-based environmental monitoring by introducing consistent, ongoing
interaction between the state and the community, in which community intelligence guides
enforcement activity. In addition, the inter-agency collaboration occurring through IVAN-
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Imperial mirrors recent shifts in CalEPA’s approach to enforcement in environmental justice
communities, and early results such as improvements at the Recology facility suggest that the
approach may lead to a measure of distributive justice in Bayview Hunters Point. The ability of
this study to draw strong conclusions about whether IVAN successfully bridges the gap from
procedural and recognition justice to distributive justice is limited, however, because IVAN lacks
a robust, accessible data set describing the outcomes of reports filed over the years.
Although IVAN is a statewide network, its approach appears to vary considerably
between regions based on on-the-ground political realities. Future research should evaluate the
function of IVAN in the Central Valley sites of Kings, Kern, and Fresno Counties. Such an
investigation could help determine the extent to which community-based environmental
reporting, in collaboration with government agencies, helps connect the dots among recognition
justice, meaningful participation, and distributive equity. The evidence that emerged in this
research suggests that the IVAN Task Forces in Bayview Hunters Point and the Imperial Valley
have navigated their unique sets of local circumstances to arrive at distinctive sets of strategies to
address environmental justice concerns. In addition, participants in IVAN-Imperial raised
concerns about the ecological and human health impacts of utility-scale renewable energy
projects on communities in the Imperial Valley. California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
continues to rise, pushing the share of renewable energy on the grid ever higher. Future research
should investigate the recognition, procedural, and distributive dimensions of utility-scale
renewable energy expansion in California desert communities. The state’s shift toward
renewable energy should benefit, not harm, its most vulnerable communities; research on the
subject should amplify the voices of community members where development has been most
concentrated.
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This thesis set out to answer the question of whether and to what degree collaborative
approaches can contribute to environmental justice. Reviewing the literature, it appeared that
there were two opposed camps, one arguing that collaboration in environmental justice problemsolving can allow partners to leverage resources more effectively and better coordinate their
efforts (Lee 2005; O’Rourke and Macey 2003). The other expressed positions ranging from
skepticism (Shilling et al. 2009) to hostility toward the notion that viewing the state as a partner
could further the cause of environmental justice (Benford 2005; Pulido et al. 2016). What
became clear in interviews for this study was that neither the residents nor the non-profit
participants in IVAN thought of this program as sufficient to address the full spectrum of
environmental injustices in their communities. Instead, IVAN works as a tool specifically to
address quality of life issues that can be solved through targeted enforcement (although in
Bayview Hunters Point, its purview has expanded since the dissolution of the Remediation
Advisory Board). In the full scope of their advocacy work, Greenaction, CCDV, and many of the
residents who attend Task Force meetings can and do move flexibly between embracing state
agencies as partners and viewing the state as the opponent. Engagement with the state need not
be an either/or proposition; instead, advocates can partner with the state on issues for which
collaboration yields results and take an adversarial stance vis à vis the state on systemic issues
where there may be less common ground. In the context and scope in which IVAN operates, it
has successfully facilitated recognition and procedural justice; however, the degree to which
distributive justice is achieved through this collaborative approach remains uncertain.
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Figure 1. The Imperial Valley

This map shows the location of the Imperial Valley, south of the Salton Sea, just north of the U.S.-Mexico border,
and east of the Laguna Mountains in eastern San Diego County. (Source: maps.google.com).
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Figure 2. Bayview Hunters Point

This map shows the location of the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood in Southeast San Francisco. The yellow
dots indicate that there have been 99 reports filed in the northern half of the neighborhood and 22 in the southern
half since the inception of the IVAN program there in 2015. Bayview Hunters Point is by far the smallest
geographical region served by an IVAN program. (Source: maps.google.com).

90

Figure 3. IVAN Regions

This figure displays the seven regions where IVAN operates and an eighth planned in Sacramento. The
sites of the two case studies in this research are circled. (Source: IVANonline.org)
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Interview Guide
Introduction
Thank you so much for taking the time to talk with me today. Today I’d like to ask you some
questions about your experience with IVAN. In my research, I’m interested in learning about the
purpose of IVAN, and I have questions about how the participants work together to achieve
IVAN’s goals.
My university requires that I go over this informed consent form with you and obtain your
signature before going ahead with the interview. I can summarize some of the most important
points, and then you’re welcome to take as much time as you need to read it before signing.
[Note that participation is voluntary, participants may request that we stop at any time, names
and other identifying info may be used, but if there is information that is particularly sensitive
participants can request that I not associate their identity with their comments on that topic, and
ask if I can audio record].
Background
1. To start out, what is your role on the Task Force?
a. Follow-up: How long have you been involved?
b. Follow-up: How often do you attend meetings?
c. Follow-up: What are your responsibilities on the Task Force?
2. What led you to become involved with IVAN?
Function
3. What do you think are the most important roles that IVAN plays?
a. Probe: Does IVAN serve any additional purpose?
b. Probe: Ask for examples whenever possible.
Structure
4. How does IVAN operate to fulfill those roles?
c. Follow-up: What are the roles and responsibilities of various participants in the
task force?
d. Follow-up: How are roles determined?
e. Follow-up: When a complaint is filed, what is the process used to address it?
f. Follow-up: How are decisions made about what complaints or what issues to
prioritize? (Ask for examples).
Outcomes of IVAN
5. What are the most important results of IVAN’s work?
g. Follow-Up: Are there any other outcomes that you feel are valuable?
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h. Follow-up: In what ways, if any, has IVAN affected environmental enforcement
in this neighborhood/region? [Ask for examples.]
i. Follow-Up: In what ways, if any, has IVAN been able to improve environmental
quality in this neighborhood/region? [Ask for examples.]
j. Follow-Up: Has IVAN affected the relationships among community advocates for
environmental justice and government agency staff members? If so, how?
6. Has your participation in IVAN changed your personally in any way? Why or why not?
k. Follow-Up: How have you incorporated these new understandings into your
activism/continued EJ advocacy/work with [your agency]?
Relationships
Something that seems to be unique about IVAN is the regular, monthly meetings among so many
different stakeholders: government agencies, non-profit organizations, and residents. I’m
interested in learning more about the task force model, so I’d like to ask you a few questions
about the interactions among participants in the task force.
7. In your experience, what are the benefits of the task force model of having different
stakeholders come together at the task force meetings?
l. Probe: Ask for examples of any benefits cited.
m. Probe: Are there any other benefits? How do residents benefit? How do agency
staff benefit? How do organizations benefit?
8. Are there any challenges associated with the collaborative approach the task force takes?
n. Ask for examples of challenges.
o. Any other challenges?
9. How does your experience with the task force compare with other experiences you have
had with environmental justice advocacy?
Conclusion
10. Is there any more information that you would like to share about your experience
working with IVAN?
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